# DISTRICTS R4

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#### **EXTRA T:**

#### Interpretation: Every plank of the plan must either ban business conduct or expand antitrust laws. Anything beyond that breaches the resolution’s ceiling.

#### “Antitrust laws” are statutory---expanding a law is distinct.

Kalbfleisch 61, District Judge. (Kalbfleisch, Opinion in Paul M. Harrod Company v. AB Dick Company, 194 F. Supp. 502 - Dist. Court, ND Ohio 1961. Google scholar caselaw, Accessed: 9-11-2021)

The definition of "antitrust laws" in 15 U.S.C.A. § 12, clearly embraces only the statutes described therein. Even without such a definition the term "antitrust laws" could not be construed as pertaining to a judgment or decree entered by a court in connection with an antitrust case filed by the Government. Such decrees do not necessarily reflect the prohibitions of the antitrust laws but may, by their terms, seek to dissipate the effects of the past conduct of the parties and, to this end, frequently enjoin performance of acts lawful in themselves. To permit a private party to recover damages for violation of any provision of such a decree is so obviously beyond the scope of the term "antitrust laws," as used in the statute, as to require no further discussion.

#### “Expand” requires a change in the law.

Hatter 90, District Judge. (Hatter, Opinion in In re Eastport Associates, 114 BR 686 - Dist. Court, CD California 1990. Google scholar caselaw. Date Accessed: 7-12-2021)

Second, Eastport asserts that the presumption against retroactivity does not apply because the amendment was intended only as a clarification of existing law. Where an amendment to a statute is remedial in nature and merely serves to clarify existing law, no question of retroactivity is involved and the law will be applied to pending cases. City of Redlands v. Sorensen, 176 Cal.App.3d 202, 211, 221 Cal.Rptr. 728, 732 (1985). The evidence in this case, however, does not support the conclusion that the amendment to section 66452.6(f) was simply a clarification of preexisting law. The Legislative Counsel's Digest specifically states that "[t]he bill would expand the definition of development moratorium." Senate Bill 186, Stats.1988, ch. 1330, at 3375 (emphasis added). Since the Legislative Counsel is a state official required by law to analyze pending legislation, it is reasonable to presume that the Legislature amended the statute with the intent and meaning expressed in the Counsel's digest. People v. Martinez, 194 Cal. App.3d 15, 22, 239 Cal.Rptr. 272, 276 (1987). By its ordinary meaning, the term "expand" indicates a change in the law, rather than a restatement of existing law. In light of the Counsel's comment, Eastport's argument is unpersuasive.

#### “Business practices” are ongoing conduct defined by the behaviors of many market participants

MacIntosh 97, Associate Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A. 1978, Pomona College; J.D. 1982, Stanford University. (Kerry Lynn, “LIBERTY, TRADE, AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: WHEN SHOULD DEFAULT RULES BE BASED ON BUSINESS PRACTICES?” *William and Mary Law Review*, vol. 38, no. 4, May 1997, p. 1465-1544. HeinOnline, Accessed: 8-27-2021)

These new and revised articles reflect a strong trend toward choosing default rules4 that codify existing business practices.5 [[BEGIN FOOTNOTE 5]] 5. In this Article, the term "business practices" is used to refer to practices that emerge over time as countless market participants exercise their freedom to engage in profitable transactions. For an account of the evolution of business practices, see infra Part II. As used here, "business practices" is broader and less technical than "trade usage," which the Code narrowly defines as "any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." U.C.C. § 1-205(2). [[END FOOTNOTE 5]] This is particularly true of the recent revisions to Articles 3 (Negotiable Instruments), 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections) and 5 (Letters of Credit).

**“Prohibition” means forbid.**

**Eaton** et al. **17**, Joseph Van Eaton, Gail Karish, Gerard Lavery Lederer, lawyers for Best Best & Krieger, Llp. Michael Watza, (3-8-2017, KITCH DRUTCHAS WAGNER VALITUTTI & SHERBROOK, “BEFORE THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C”, COMMENTS OF SMART COMMUNITIES SITING COALITION, https://tellusventure.com/downloads/policy/fcc\_row/smart\_communities\_siting\_coaltion\_comments\_mobilitie\_8mar2017.pdf)

2. What are at issue legally are prohibitions and effective prohibitions, and not hindrances, as the Commission seems to suggest in its Notice. The term “prohibit” is not defined in the Act, but it has an ordinary meaning: to formally forbid (something) by law, rule, or other authority; or to “prevent, stop, rule out, preclude, make impossible.” A mere “hindrance” “is simply notin accord withthe ordinaryand fairmeaning” of the term prohibit,104 and can provide no basis for additional Commission intrusions on local authority over wireless facilities. Much of what Mobilitie complains about is a “hindrance” at most (and usually a hindrance magnified by its own actions).

#### Violation: the plan analyzes mergers and investigates corporations.

#### Voter for limits and ground---there are an infinite number of ways to merely increase prosecution that avoid core generics.

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#### STATES COUNTERPLAN:

#### Text: The 50 US states should enact and enforce coordinated antitrust laws that allow for antitrust injury to include the threat of loss of profits due to possible price competition following a merger.

#### States solve.

Arteaga 21, \*Juan A., JD @ Colombia Law, Chambers-ranked antitrust partner, Co-Chair of Crowell & Moring’s New York Antitrust Practice, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division. \*\*Jordan Ludwig, JD @ Loyola, partner in the Antitrust & Competition Group @ Crowell & Moring (1-28-2021, "The Role of US State Antitrust Enforcement", Global Competition Review, Lexology, <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3523359d-e7d7-489f-8f18-c0e4db0801cf>)

Since the reawakening of state antitrust enforcement nearly 30 years ago, state attorneys general have continued to play an important role in the enforcement of both state and federal antitrust laws. During periods of lax federal antitrust enforcement, state attorneys general have often ramped up their enforcement activity in order to protect consumers from anticompetitive transactions and business practices. During periods of vigorous federal antitrust enforcement, they have often served as strong partners for the DOJ and FTC by, among other things, offering valuable insights about competitive dynamics in local markets, assisting with obtaining information from key market participants (including state governmental entities that are direct purchasers of goods and services), and helping develop and implement litigation strategies for cases being tried before federal judges presiding in their states.

Since January 2017, state attorneys general have increasingly played a leading and independent antitrust enforcement role. State antitrust enforcers have significantly increased their enforcement activity and willingness to act separately from their federal counterparts because many of them believe that there has been ‘under-enforcement’ by the DOJ and FTC. State antitrust enforcers have also been able to enhance their influence over key competition policy issues and the antitrust enforcement agenda within the United States because there appears to have been a significant decline in the coordination and relationship between the DOJ and FTC.

In once again flexing their enforcement muscle, state attorneys general have shown a willingness to publicly disagree with the DOJ and FTC on both policy and enforcement decisions, and have also sought to pressure their federal counterparts into more aggressively policing certain industries. Recent examples of

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#### ADVANTAGE COUNTERPLAN:

#### The United States federal government should:

#### substantially expand international food aid, and at least double investments in agricultural and food research over the next 10 years and,

#### establish a domestic climate policy including substantially increasing Clean Air Act Section 111 restrictions on private sector concentrated animal feedlot operation emissions of greenhouse gases in the United States.

#### That solves food shortages.

Keefe ’15 (Meagan; assistant director of global agriculture and food at The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, former Mickey Leland International Hunger Fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute, MS in natural resource management from the University of Minnesota, Associate Director of the Program of African Studies at Northwestern University; May 2015; “Leveraging Innovation to Feed the Future”; <https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/GlobalAg_ResearchBrief_v4.pdf>; The Chicago Council on Global Affairs; accessed 7/6/18; TV bruh)

The United States should double investments in agricultural and food research over the next 10 years. The United States needs to double investments in agricultural and food research over the next 10 years to help meet these challenges. Research funds should be focused on priorities that will be most important to meeting future demand: equipping agriculture both domestically and in low-income countries to be resilient to climate change and weather variability; aligning agricultural production and nutrition goals; and ensuring agricultural production builds rather than harms the natural resource base. Public agencies— such as USDA, the new Foundation for Food and Agricultural Research, and National Science Foundation— the US Congress, and research universities will be game-changing players in increasing the investment in agricultural research and reshaping national priorities. Given the lag time between the research funding and the eventual uptake of technologies, R&D investment decisions need to be taken with a long-term perspective and a funding horizon of at least a decade. Forge a new science of agriculture Agriculture’s mandate should be expanded beyond simply increasing production. Agriculture must increase production in a way that uses fewer resources and optimizes nutrition outcomes while providing solid incomes to food producers. Experts from all scientific disciplines are needed to increase nutritious food production sustainably. Proven approaches and innovations should be transferred to farmers everywhere, but especially to women and underproducing farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. A new multidisciplinary science of agriculture is needed and should be based on increasing outputs—production, nutrition, and incomes—while using less land and water resources.14 This requires improving human health through accessible nutritious food, improving food safety, and reducing food waste along the supply chain. The US Congress should consider convening a national, bipartisan commission that draws from the policy, university, business, and civil society sectors to develop a research agenda for how to overcome future food challenges sustainably, nutritiously, and economically. Build research capacity Because the challenges facing the food system will be both global and local, international research institutions need increased support. At the same time, there is a need for transforming university and research institutions in developing countries so that they conduct the research that is critical to their location, context, and people. The US government has ramped up this type of training over the past five years, but it is nowhere near the level of support the US provided in the 1970s and ’80s at the height of the Green Revolution.15 These efforts should be expanded to develop local institutions in developing countries. This can be done through public-private partnerships, educational exchanges, and connecting universities around the world. The US university system is well positioned to contribute to this, but increased funding is needed to facilitate partnerships and educational exchanges between universities in the United States and institutions in the developing world. Bolster research on climate change Climate change is already beginning to threaten the global food supply. Recent scientific reports predict that the hotter temperatures and natural disasters already undermining food production will be increasingly common. The effects from climate change are expected to slow the growth of food production by 2 percent each decade for the rest of this century.16 The US government must increase funding for research to build resilience and address the threats to the food system posed by climate change. In order to prepare for climate change, more research is needed on increasing tolerance to higher temperatures, building resilience to extreme weather events, and combating pests and diseases. While it’s becoming increasingly clear that the consequences of climate change will be severe, there are significant gaps in the current understanding of the effects along the value chain, from farmers’ fields to consumers. Better models are needed to help understand the effects of climate change. Food producers cannot prepare effectively and researchers and businesses cannot innovate without better data. Data on weather, water resources, crop performance, land use, and consumer preferences are necessary to adequately prepare. Better models and data are crucial for increasing productivity, enhancing nutrition, and increasing resilience to the effects of climate change.17 Expand nutrition-sensitive agricultural research Malnutrition—from undernourishment to obesity—is already affecting every country on earth and placing nearly one-half of the world’s population at serious health risk.18 Although nutrition interventions such as therapeutic foods to manage severe acute malnutrition and supplements to address micronutrient deficiencies are necessary, good health is driven largely by access to overall nutritious diets.19 The US government should make nutrition a key priority in agricultural research to increase access to healthy foods, drive economic growth in poor countries, and improve the livelihoods of small-scale farmers. The current fruit and vegetable supply is far from sufficient for everyone to meet recommended nutrient intakes, especially in low-income countries. Research across the entire food value chain is critical in order to increase production; reduce costs; and improve the storage, processing, and transport of horticultural crops.20 In addition, food safety is an often neglected but essential component at the nexus between nutrition and agriculture that requires additional research. Aflatoxin contamination is one of the most pressing food safety challenges in developing countries, affecting one-quarter of harvests worldwide. Reduce food waste An estimated one-third of all food produced globally is wasted. In developed countries, consumers throw too much food away. In developing countries, food often rots before it can be processed or brought to market because of poor infrastructure that allows pests and other contaminants to run rampant. Innovations in reducing food waste are desperately needed. Because fruits and vegetables as well as fish spoil more quickly and are more difficult to transport than grains, they are wasted in greater quantities—along with the valuable nutrients they contain.21 In addition, the higher temperatures and humidity brought by climate change will cause even more food to be wasted without innovations in cold storage and transport. Finding innovative ways to reduce food waste and bringing them to scale would help meet the increasing demand for food without necessarily growing more food. Innovation from the private sector could help significantly in addressing this challenge. US leadership is crucial for meeting the challenges to the global food system. As the rate of agricultural productivity growth continues to slow both in the US and globally, it is clear that a change in the global research enterprise is essential to meet the future challenge of feeding two billion more people by 2050. The United States is a global leader in agricultural research, holding almost 15 percent of the world’s public agricultural knowledge stock. US leadership is crucial for revitalizing the research institutions and investments needed to increase productivity, produce more nutritious food, use fewer resources, and adapt to climate change. Investing in agricultural research and taking a more comprehensive approach to utilizing existing knowledge would help safeguard the productivity gains made in the United States over the past century while meeting the future challenges facing the global food system.

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#### RACIAL CAPITALISM K:

#### The plan strengthens free markets and saves capitalism.

Parakkal & Bartz-Marvez 13, \*Assistant Professor of International Relations, Philadelphia University, \*\*Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Miami. (Raju, Sherry, Winter 2013, “Capitalism, democratic capitalism, and the pursuit of antitrust laws”, The Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 58, No. 4, DOI: 10.1177/0003603X1305800409)

Antitrust laws have historically been associated with countries that possess a free-market capitalist economy, which is understood as an economic system in which competition and the market forces of demand and supply determine economic outcomes. This historical association between capitalism and antitrust laws is evident from the fact that the countries that first adopted national antitrust laws, such as Canada, the United States, and the countries of Western Europe, are countries that have long embraced a market economy. On the contrary, the statist economies of the erstwhile Soviet bloc and many developing countries, for the most part, did not institute antitrust laws of the type associated with free market economies. Notwithstanding these country examples, which indicate a positive association between a capitalist economic system and antitrust laws, there exist arguments that both support and oppose antitrust laws for a capitalist economy. Arguments in support of antitrust laws for a capitalist economy begin with the fundamental understanding that the most important ingredient of a capitalist system is market competition. The presence of a competitive market is vital to achieving the efficiency levels that a capitalist economy seeks. Therefore, competitive forces need to be protected to discipline the market players, especially the dominant ones. By preventing and punishing anticompetitive practices by market players, an antitrust law protects and promotes market competition. 1 In the United States, which is commonly understood to be the leading bastion of free-market capitalism and one of the first countries to enact an antitrust law, the role of antitrust legislation in preserving the capitalist character of its economic system is underscored by the near-constitutional status accorded to its antitrust statues by the U.S. Supreme Court. 2 The Court described these statutes as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” and “as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”3 Such a sentiment is appropriate, given that the American antitrust law, the Sherman Act, was passed in 1890 to protect economic competition from rapidly-growing “trusts.”4 While the social and political zeitgeist has changed considerably since the passing of the Sherman Act, the fact remains that antitrust is perceived as key to “protecting consumers against anticompetitive conduct that raises prices, reduces output, and hinders innovation and economic growth.”5 Moreover, it is understood that “competition is a public good, and society cannot expect the victims of anticompetitive conduct to protect themselves.”6 The implication therefore is that government power, through the enforcement of antitrust statutes, is critical to reining in corporate power in order to protect economic competition and capitalism.

#### The plan is neoliberal ag’s dream---their analytic presumes trickle-down economics and ignores the devastating labor conditions on small farms

Rosenberg 21, visiting scholar at the Harvard Food Law and Policy Clinic and an adjunct professor at the University of Iowa College of Law. Bryce Stucki is an independent journalist based in Washington, DC who writes about food and agriculture. (Nathan, “Don’t Trust the Antitrust Narrative: Farmers Benefit from Industrial Ag. Workers Do Not.,” Jacobin, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/06/antitrust-farmers-farmworkers-exploitation-agribusiness-low-pay-dangerous-working-conditions)

The antitrust critique of industrial agriculture dominates discussions of the farm economy in progressive media and policy circles. In a fiery attack on Joe Biden’s agricultural team during the 2020 campaign, David Dayen argued that cattle ranchers, hog farmers, and crop producers are all at the mercy of corporate middlemen like Cargill and Bayer, who exert excessive control over the industry and bend farmers to their will. In her 2020 book Break ’Em Up, Zephyr Teachout uses the metaphor of “chickenization” to compare the plight of chicken farmers forced to use the feed supplied by Tyson to rideshare drivers who must accept Uber’s rate cuts. “Some of the biggest Fortune 500 companies may be in agriculture and are making huge profits,” Teachout writes, “but farmers are poor and insecure.” The antitrust movement is not wrong to focus on the power of corporations: agribusiness has helped transform huge swathes of the globe into biological wastelands, depopulated the countryside, and created a class of hyper-exploited workers. But the standard antitrust analysis overlooks how much US farmers benefit from, and are invested in, the current system. Farmworkers’ low pay and dangerous work conditions, meanwhile, put them in direct conflict with farmers. They have long led fights for environmental and labor reforms — and the industry’s dependence on their labor gives them potentially enormous bargaining power. They — not farmers — will be at the forefront of any effort to democratize agriculture. Affluent Farmers Most farmers in the United States today enjoy high incomes and wealth. The median farm household has a total income 21 percent higher than the overall median household and 75 percent higher than the rural median. Ninety-seven percent of farm households boast a higher net worth than the median household, and the median farm household has a nonfarm net wealth 2.5 times higher than the median household and a total net wealth nine times higher (both of these figures account for debts). The general farm economy is also strong. Despite innumerable reports that use total farm income to argue US farmers are in crisis, per farm net income has rarely been better. Five of the ten best farm income years since the Great Depression have come in the last decade. How, then, do antitrust writers produce so much data to suggest that farmers are poor? Most often, they misinterpret numbers that require a great deal more context. One of the most common antitrust arguments is that the farmer’s share of the food dollar has fallen from 37 cents in 1980 to around 15 cents today. This is true — though the share hasn’t changed much since at least 1993 — but total spending on food is up and the number of farms is down. The upshot: farm revenues are at near record levels today. Antitrust writers also often use summary statistics skewed by the Department of Agriculture’s idiosyncratic definition of “farm.” David Dayen writes that “more than half of all farm households are losing money.” But the USDA’s Census of Agriculture, the source of many such figures, includes an enormous number of “farms” that do very little farming, if any at all. After the USDA’s constituency of farmers declined sharply after World War II — and along with it, the department’s influence — it began to liberalize its definition of “farm,” counting rural properties with no agricultural production at all as farm operations when they are deemed capable of producing $1,000 in sales. If you have a hundred acres of grass and woodland, a fifth of an acre of fruit-bearing trees, or a fifteenth of an acre of berries — as many wealthy rural residents do — you’re a “farmer” according to USDA. Almost a quarter of the operations in the 2017 census did not sell any farm products whatsoever. Though the census reports around two million agricultural operations, two-thirds of these, according to the best available data, are retiree or “lifestyle” farms. Unsurprisingly, they drag down aggregate measures of farm income. Farm organizations portray low- or zero-sales farms as low-income families struggling to get back into agriculture. In reality, most of these farms are owned by wealthy rural and exurban residents who have no interest in farming as a business. The median household with a “residence” farm — a category that makes up almost all small-scale farms and the majority of all farms — lost $1,600 in farm income in 2019. But these same households, at the median, take in more than $100,000 in total income and hold around $450,000 in net nonfarm wealth — about four times the median US household. As journalist Maggie Koerth put it in a 2016 investigative report, most small farmers in the agricultural census “aren’t the farms of the poor; they’re the yards of the upper-middle-class.” Farm houseolds have significantly higher net worth than non-farm households. With only non-farm assets and debts included, the median residence farm household, which families tend to own for lifestyle reasons, has about 2.5 times as much net wealth as the median white household and 22 times as much as the median black household. With farm wealth included, the median residence farm has almost 5 times as much wealth as the median household. Commercial farms, which are responsible for the vast majority of all farm production, have an astronomical net wealth of $2.7 million — about 130 times that of the median black household. Almost all farmers, meanwhile, are white. The few farms that do engage in market production tend to make boatloads of money. Only about 340,000 farms, 80 percent of them family-owned, accounted for 90 percent of sales in 2012. These are what USDA calls “farm businesses,” excluding so-called “low sales farms,” which churn out almost no agricultural products. Even farm businesses with “moderate sales” boast a median farm income of $46,000, a median household income of $95,000, and a median net wealth of $1.8 million. “Midsize” farms make a median of $102,000 off farming and have a total net wealth of $2.4 million. These figures shoot through the roof for larger operations. What About Debt? Many readers will be surprised to read that farmers have so much wealth, since antitrust analysts and journalists often point out that total farm debt is at an all-time high. What they don’t mention — in addition to not adjusting for inflation — is that farm assets have increased at even higher rates. Farms also often have substantial nonfarm wealth they can draw on when their incomes dip. The net wealth figures cited throughout this piece account for both debts and inflation, while the total wealth figures account for nonfarm wealth. Animal farmers, who figure prominently in the conventional antitrust narrative, are no exception to the general rule of farmer affluence. David Dayen, in Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power, writes that “a 2013 Pew report noted that 71 percent of all chicken farmers earn incomes below the poverty line.” Zephyr Teachout uses the same figure in Break ’Em Up, as does the Open Markets Institute in an oft-cited report. The source for this figure appears to be an unpublished 2001 report that found 71 percent of households whose only source of income is a chicken farm were in poverty. The comparable number for today is not readily available, but data from the USDA (obtained for this article) show that even the lowest-sales broiler farm businesses boast a median household income of $69,000 and a net wealth of over $1 million. The figures are similar for cattle and hog farmers. Source: Special tabulation from USDA. None of this is to say that there aren’t chicken farmers, dairy farmers, and some other farmers who struggle. But the numbers tell us that farmers are overwhelmingly wealthy and overwhelmingly conservative. Studies of campaign contributions have concluded that agriculture is among the most conservative industries, and a poll last year found 80 percent of farmers approved of Donald Trump. The story is quite different for farmworkers. Exploited Farmworkers Farmworkers perform most of the labor in US agriculture, yet they are relegated to a second-class status. A special tabulation we received from the USDA shows that farmworkers work 60 percent of the hours on the farms that account for 90 percent of all agricultural production, while earning a fraction of the money. Farmers may only earn 15 cents of each food dollar, but farmworkers receive only 1.2 cents — and split those cents among more people, since there are far more farmworkers than farmers. Data on farmworkers in animal production is patchy, but an expert who studies farm labor in California found they may earn about $30,000 per year. Crop workers, meanwhile, have a median annual income of $17,500 to $20,000 and a third have family incomes below the poverty line. A leading expert estimates two-thirds are undocumented. They often lack safe drinking water, toil under body-destroying labor conditions, and are exposed to dangerous levels of pesticides (at much higher levels than farmers). With no hope to purchase enough land to enter commercial farming, researcher Philip L. Martin writes, they labor in “an apartheid industry.” And when things go wrong, farmworkers are often offered up as scapegoats. In the rare instance that authorities prosecute animal abuse on agricultural operations, it is almost always farmworkers who are punished. A familiar pattern has emerged when animal rights organizations release videos of feedlot animal abuse: owners express their shock and dismay, workers are fired, and local prosecutors charge those workers with animal abuse. The owners are not held criminally liable despite creating the working conditions that lead to such abuse. Many large farms also do their hiring through subcontractors that use the threat of deportation to keep wages down and unions out. While some farmers feel pressure from companies like Bayer, farmworkers feel a much more acute pressure from farmers themselves. The farm lobby and other conservative interests work hard to keep farmworkers under their thumb. Recently, they pushed to expand the H-2A visa program — which President Trump agreed to — a program many farmworkers and organizers compare to slavery. Farmworkers with an H-2A visa must stay with their employers and risk deportation if they complain. A 2020 study found that 38 percent of Department of Labor investigations of agricultural operations uncovered H-2A violations, while a 2020 analysis of one hundred interviews with H-2A workers found that 94 percent had suffered three or more “serious legal violations,” which included “seriously substandard housing,” “verbal threats,” and significant wage theft.” And perhaps most perversely, many farmworkers come to the United States in the first place because American foreign policy — trade deals, coups, and other meddling — destabilized their homes and drove them out in search of decent wages. Class Conflict in the Fields The antitrust movement is aware of many of these problems of worker exploitation and will readily concede the need for greater labor protections. But their unmistakable focus is on farmers, which has led them to endorse a trickle-down theory in which farmers, post-trust-busting, will grant their workers a cut of the extra profits. According to antitrust advocates Sandeep Vaheesan and Claire Kelloway, “Reducing the oppressive buyer power of massive retailers like Walmart, and dominant meat processors, like Tyson, would help return a larger share of the food dollar to producers, and, by extension, their workers.” This sounds logical — if farmers had more money, they’d have more of it to give to their workers — but it quickly falls apart under scrutiny. Farmers have plenty of income to share with their workers already, yet, as private businesses are wont to do, they share as little of it as they can. When profits spiked in the mid-2000s, wages didn’t budge. When they jumped again in the early 2010s, wages rose only a modest amount, with the largest hikes actually coming after farm income dipped again. Philip L. Martin, the scholar of farm labor, attributes a recent uptick in wages to a decline in immigration and state-level increases in the minimum wage, rather than generosity among hiring managers. Agricultural workers don’t need wealthier bosses, they need more rights — to unionize, to be free of harassment and mistreatment, to decent food and housing, and to collectively own the land they work. The antitrust approach also does little to solve more fundamental problems in agriculture. In 1524, the German peasant leader and preacher Thomas Müntzer lambasted the nobility for taking living creatures as their private property. He wrote, outraged, “that all creatures have been turned into property, the fish in the water, the birds in the air, the plants on the earth — all living things must also become free.” Karl Marx approvingly cited Müntzer three hundred twenty years later, when he argued that capitalism not only degrades how we relate to each other, but also how we relate to nature. As long as we treat living things as commodities, neither they, nor we, will be free. A programmatic path to the liberation of all things is beyond the scope of this essay — instead, we offer a critique. Antitrust enforcement can be a useful and even necessary tool at times. With at least two-thirds of farmland in the hands of the same wealthy owners responsible for 90 percent of sales, the antitrust movement would be well-served to renew calls for land reform that were popular with earlier US agrarian and left-populist movements. But when antitrust proponents use concentration to explain all the ills of agriculture, they distort reality. The break ’em up response to industrial agriculture may distribute human and animal misery more evenly (at best), but it does not address the root of this misery: exploitation. The standard antitrust analysis posits that tending to the needs of a small, highly conservative, and well-off constituency will ultimately benefit their workers and society. This is a mistake. Not only are there far more farmworkers than farmers — at least 2.5 times as many as there are farm businesses — farmers are already at the forefront of movements against environmental abuses and labor violations by their employers: that is to say, farmers. In recent years, farmworkers and their families have won collective bargaining rights in New York State, a new union in Washington, and safer pesticide regulations throughout the country, despite massive institutional and legal disadvantages. Still, farmworkers lack basic labor protections in most of the country, much less the kind of extravagant public support that farmers receive. Farmworkers understand that the size of a farm tells us next to nothing about its labor or environmental practices. As Margaret Gray and others have documented, smaller-scale and local farms often have among the worst working conditions and wages. Instead of idealizing yeoman farmers, we must fight for a future where we collectively hold the land together, and farmworkers labor for no one but themselves. Only they have the ability, through withholding and redirecting their labor, to shut down and reshape food production in the United States. Antitrust writers argue that breaking up agribusiness will help farmers and farmworkers alike. They dream of a cross-class alliance, but deny the intense conflict already with us, playing out every day in fields and farmhouses across the country.

#### Racial capitalism subordinates billions and threatens extinction.

Gonzalez 20, Morris I. Leibman Professor of Law at Loyola University Chicago School of Law and Professor Emerita at Seattle University School of Law. (Carmen, 10-27-2020, "Climate Change and Racial Capitalism", *LPE Project*, <https://lpeproject.org/blog/climate-change-and-racial-capitalism/>)

Racialized communities have borne the brunt of the carbon-based capitalist world economy from its colonial origins through the contemporary climate crisis. They have been enslaved, exploited, dispossessed, and subjected to both the physical violence of invasion and occupation and the structural “slow violence” of polluting industry. From the Niger Delta to the Canadian tar sands, racially subordinated populations living in the shadows of oil drilling, coal mining, oil and gas pipelines, power plants, refineries, and petrochemical plants are poisoned by toxic chemicals and treated as surplus and disposable. In my article in the inaugural issue of JLPE, I break new ground by examining climate change and climate change-induced displacement through the framework of racial capitalism. Drawing upon the work of political theorist Cedric Robinson and sociologist Aníbal Quijano, I treat racism and capitalism as inextricably intertwined. Robinson argues that capitalism emerged from a feudal order thoroughly infused with racial (or proto-racial) hierarchies. Quijano identifies Europe’s violent conquest of the Americas as the pivotal event that globalized white supremacy and established the capitalist world economy. Both have analyzed how racism makes oppression socially acceptable by portraying large segments of humanity as inferior, unworthy, and expendable. In my article, I focus on how the global capitalist order has used racism to create the conditions for the massive unchecked resource extraction that has caused global climate change and for pushing the burden of its impacts onto those who are most vulnerable and least responsible. CLIMATE INJUSTICE Climate change is caused primarily by the world’s most affluent inhabitants but threatens the lives and livelihoods of those who contributed least to the problem. As climate change intensifies, those most susceptible to climate-related disasters and displacement are also overwhelmingly persons classified as non-white. They reside in vulnerable geographic locations (such as coastal zones, the Arctic, and the Pacific island states), and have been deprived of the resources to protect themselves from harm through centuries of predatory economic policies. Despite the disproportionate impact of climate change on vulnerable populations who have been largely ignored due to their racialization, legal scholarship on climate displacement has often adopted a doctrinal approach that fails to analyze the underlying systemic causes of the climate crisis and its relationship to race and racism. I focus on international law in particular. CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW International law has mounted an inadequate response to the climate crisis. The climate treaties have failed to curb global temperature increases, and have delivered insufficient adaptation assistance to climate-vulnerable states and peoples. Even though climate-related disasters and slow-onset events (such as sea level rise) threaten to displace millions of people, international law provides very limited protection to persons who flee their country of origin to escape the ravages of climate change. Neither the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the treaties governing climate change requires countries to admit climate-displaced persons. Part of the problem is that international law has been complicit in the project of racial capitalism. As Antony Anghie explains, international law originates in the colonial encounter and has justified successive Northern interventions in the Global South through a variety of doctrines – including terra nullius, the doctrine of discovery, the mandate system, trusteeship, modernization, and development. International law has depicted Southern peoples as so primitive, savage, uncivilized, backward, and under-developed that their lives, livelihoods, and cultures are unworthy of protection. It has also created the rules and institutions of the capitalist world system through which Northern states and transnational corporations maintain an iron grip on the states and people of the South, including trade law, foreign investment law, and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. EMERGING LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES TO CLIMATE DISPLACEMENT In the absence of a binding legal framework, three emerging legal and policy responses to climate displacement threaten to reinforce racialized hierarchies and to trap large segments of humanity in places that are becoming uninhabitable. First, the national security response constructs climate-displaced persons as barbarians crashing the gates of civilization, and has fostered the criminalization, detention, and expulsion of migrants. Second, the humanitarian response reinforces racial hierarchies by portraying climate-displaced persons as primitive, backward, and in need of charity rather than justice. Its voluntary initiatives to protect disaster-displaced persons obscure the Global North’s responsibility for climate change and have little chance of succeeding at a time of rising nationalism and xenophobia. Third, the migration management response encourages climate-displaced persons to finance climate resilience in their home countries through temporary labor migration. This approach shifts responsibility for climate change adaptation from affluent states to exploitable workers from the world’s poorest and most climate-vulnerable populations. The exodus of able-bodied workers may also exacerbate the vulnerability of “trapped populations” (darker-skinned, older, disabled) by producing a brain drain, labor shortages, and reliance on erratic remittance flows. A JUST SOLUTION TO CLIMATE DISPLACEMENT? Another way is possible. Climate-vulnerable states and peoples have called for an approach to climate displacement grounded in their collective right to self-determination and to legal continuity as self-governing communities on the territories of other states. This proposal deserves consideration. Successful implementation of it requires a responsibility-based framework that imposes obligations on affluent states to finance the mobility decisions of climate-displaced populations based on their contribution to the climate crisis. The self-determination approach is an example of the ways that Southern states and peoples are developing counter-hegemonic interpretations of international law that will permit them to shape their own history and transcend the colonially-imposed borders that impede mobility and increase climate vulnerability. An analysis of climate displacement grounded in racial capitalism must identify who benefits from policies that stoke racism and militarize borders. These beneficiaries include the corporations that provide surveillance, border walls, and detention facilities; the security apparatus of the state; the businesses that exploit undocumented or incarcerated migrants; and the authoritarian populists who demonize migrants in order to persuade working class whites to support policies that intensify economic inequality and hasten catastrophic climate change. Although greenhouse gases do not respect national borders, national elites deploy racialized systems of border control to perpetuate the illusion that persons classified as white can somehow escape the economic and ecological ravages of capitalism by erecting walls and fortresses. Racism enables states and corporations to pursue policies catastrophic to the planet and its inhabitants because the worst and most immediate consequences are inflicted on stigmatized populations in the sacrifice zones of the fossil fuel economy. While focusing on the problem of climate displacement, the article uses the framework of racial capitalism to highlight how the struggles for racial, economic, and climate justice are interconnected and interdependent. Racism creates divisions between people whose economic and ecological vulnerability should serve as the basis for solidarity and resistance. As economic inequality increases and the planet’s ecosystems are brought to the brink of collapse, all but the ultra-affluent will become frontline communities in an increasingly damaged and dangerous world. Deconstructing racial hierarchies is necessary in order to foster the collective action required to avert climate catastrophe. Climate change is not an isolated crisis, but a symptom of an economic (dis)order that jeopardizes the future of life on this planet. Through a race-conscious analysis of climate change grounded in political economy, this article seeks to engage scholars in a variety of disciplines in order to develop more robust critiques of the laws, institutions, and ideologies that maintain racial capitalism and pose an existential threat to humanity.

#### Vote neg to reject the aff and affirm place-based resistance.

Bledsoe et al. 19, \*Adam, assistant professor in the Department of Geography and African American Studies Program at Florida State University. \*\*Tyler McCreary, assistant professor in the Department of Geography at Florida State University, \*\*\*Willie Jamaal Wright, assistant professor of geography at Florida State University. (“Theorizing diverse economies in the context of racial capitalism”, *Geoforum*, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.07.004>)

As acknowledged in the literature above, unorthodox value systems and modes of production are often present within Black-led cooperatives. Through collective community-building initiatives by groups like Cooperation Jackson and Cooperative Community of New West Jackson, Jackson has risen as a promising place for the incubation and application of economic, spatial, and political alternatives. Applying the analytic of marronage to discussions of commoning can contribute timely, place-based contributions to the study of cooperatives and the commons. Thinking of the commons, particularly of urban commons, through a lens of marronage may help residents and organizers in selecting and acquiring common property as well as in recreating modes of living beyond and before the (re)imposition of capital. Though communities are adept at determining their needs, as efforts such as D-Town Farms and the CCNWJ indicate, making academic resources, concepts, and methods available to collective and cooperative practices may lead to any number of fruitful and unforeseen outcomes. Finally, as residents and researchers are not immune to the trappings of spatial imaginaries based in logics of individual ownership (see Wright and Herman, 2018), an analytic of marronage has the potential to influence the spatial imaginaries of residents and researchers, alike, so that more of us come to view landscapes of marronage as more than blank slates for capitalist development but as the future of innumerable publics.

7. Conclusion

Analyses of racial capitalism are necessary in the drive to create alternatives to capitalism. If diverse economies hope to address phenomena like urban decay, gentrification, and environmental degradation, they must first recognize that notions of racial difference make such arrangements possible. Urban disinvestment, the repurposing of urban space, and the treatment of spaces as empty contribute directly to the reproduction of capitalist modes of production. In the context of North America, these mechanisms of accumulation occur precisely because the communities most affected by them remain subordinated to logics of conquest. The afterlives of settler colonialism and chattel slavery inform the realities of present-day capitalism, as the displacement and spatial fixing of Indigenous and Black populations—central to the initial rise of global capitalism—continue to be central characteristics of capital accumulation. Creating alternatives to capitalism thus means first recognizing how conquest continues to structure capitalist modes of production.

In the examples given above, Black and Indigenous communities provide clear analyses of the logics and concrete economic factors that oppress them. In recognizing how economic abandonment and intentional disinvestment from city spaces serve to reproduce capitalism and oppress their communities, Black communities in Detroit and Jackson and Indigenous communities in Winnipeg and Minneapolis offer a grounded theory of racial capitalism. These communal analyses explore particular manifestations of present-day capitalism, uncovering how capital accumulation takes place via the oppression of racialized populations. More importantly, these communities push beyond a diagnosis of oppressive dynamics and create place-specific alternatives to the expressions of capitalism they encounter. The establishment of public housing in Winnipeg and Minneapolis and the cultivation of commons through practices of marronage in Detroit and Jackson both entail alternatives to the forms of capitalism that displace the Indigenous and Black communities present in those cities. These communities, then, employ an analysis of racial capitalism to enact diverse economies.

Literature on diverse economies and actual, material creations of alternatives to capitalism can look to examples like those described above as they try to envision and implement economies that do not reproduce capitalist modes of production. Winnipeg, Minneapolis, Detroit, and Jackson are hardly the only locations in which capitalism has taken hold, and different locations will have to wage their own struggles against the specific forms of capitalism they face. Nonetheless, the movements described in this paper offer an important blueprint for how analysis and praxis can walk hand in hand. To create futures not dominated by capitalism requires both an honest assessment of the workings of racial capitalism and the ability to create alternatives to such arrangements. Looking to examples like those above are a starting point from which we can take both of these steps.

### 1NC

#### HORSE-TRADING DA:

#### Antitrust legislation only passes after it’s horse-traded with Republicans for censorship prohibitions

Perera 3-12-2021, veteran cybersecurity reporter, Data security & privacy reporter for MLex (Dave, “US antitrust legislation faces uphill battle despite unified Democratic government,” <https://mlexmarketinsight.com/news-hub/editors-picks/area-of-expertise/antitrust/us-antitrust-legislation-faces-uphill-battle-despite-unified-democratic-government>)

Renewed interest among US lawmakers in antitrust legislation is unlikely to produce radical policy shifts, notwithstanding the Democratic Party’s unified control of the federal government. Democrats promised a “big, bold agenda” after they captured the Senate by a hairsbreadth in January. Democratic lawmakers may very well stick to those ambitions and announce audacious legislative proposals. But the fate of those bills is at the mercy of a political dynamic ensuring that the more liberal the policy prescriptions, the less likely they are to become law. The most likely outcome over the next two years is more funding for enforcers at the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, whether directly through appropriated funds, steeper merger notification filing fees, or both. It’s also possible Congress could incrementally tinker along the edges of antitrust. It might lower the threshold for challenging mergers, or mandate data portability requirements for social media companies. Those expecting — or fearing — more ambitious outcomes likely won’t see them enacted. So until America’s November 2022 election, scratch from the list of high probabilities reforms such as requiring dominant firms to separate lines of business, or shifting the burden of proof onto an acquiring company. Put another way, unless a bill can attract significant Republican support, not even two years of unified Democratic government can guarantee reforms. — American exceptionalism — Single party control of both congressional chambers and the presidency is relatively rare in American politics. It has occurred in fewer than a third of legislative sessions since 1980. When it strikes, it doesn’t last long — typically just the two years between one congressional election and another. Historically, unified control is a fertile period for new regulations. President George W. Bush overhauled Medicare. President Barack Obama ushered in financial sector reforms and the Affordable Care Act. Indications are that President Joe Biden is emboldened by his party’s last-minute capture of the Senate. History, of course, isn’t a blueprint. Even a brief look at past episodes of unified control reveals that not even single-party capture of the executive and legislative branches of the US government can assure the enactment of a partisan agenda. For one thing, neither political party is a monolith. Although far more politically aligned than when Democratic conservatives found common cause in the 20th century with Republicans, the major American parties nonetheless are coalitions of centrist and activist wings. For Democrats, the tensions inherent in appeasing all sides became apparent earlier this month when centrists trimmed benefits in the $1.9 trillion coronavirus stimulus package. Neither is single party grip on power secure unless it commands an overwhelming majority in the Senate, thanks to a uniquely American institution: the filibuster. In the Senate, the rules mandate a three-fifths vote before debate over a bill is cut off. In recent decades, it’s become a weapon routinely wielded by the minority party to kill legislation. The upshot is that policy legislation needs supermajority support before it can proceed, meaning the 50 Democrats of today’s Senate have little choice but to resign themselves to the grind of finding Republican supporters. There are limited exceptions. Assuming Democrats stay in unison, they don’t need Republican votes to appoint judges, approve executive branch nominations or pass fiscal legislation such as the coronavirus stimulus that just became law. It’s within Democrats’ power to abolish the filibuster, but for now, the maneuver appears safe. Asked just days ago about the matter, White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki told reporters that the president’s preference is for it to stay in place. “The president is an optimist by nature,” Psaki added. — Hunting for bipartisan consensus — Not every bill introduced in Congress, nor even every bill approved by a committee or even an entire single chamber, makes it through the process because its sponsors believe it’ll become law. There are a host of bills drafted with the intent of sending a message to industry, to independent regulators, to donors, to constituents. There are bills that lawmakers view as setting out a position to influence an ongoing policy debate. Even if it won’t become law this year, it might the next year, or the next, reintroduced and refined along the way. Telltale signs of whether a bill is a serious attempt at law are the number of cosponsors, and whether that list of names includes members of both parties in good stead with their party’s leadership. Bipartisan support is important even in the House, where Democrats have the votes to completely bypass Republicans. Because the House doesn’t have the filibuster to contend with, those with the majority of seats control the chamber. House Democrats can and do pass bills in the face of absolute House Republican opposition, but — special exceptions for fiscal bills aside — those bills are dead on arrival in the Senate. As long as the filibuster exists or Democrats lack a Senate supermajority, the House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee must court Republican support if its intention is to make new law. Finding clues of what House Democrats might seriously achieve, then, may be little more difficult than looking up the policy prescriptions House Republicans favor: giving regulators more resources, shifting the burden of proof in merger cases and boosting data portability and interoperability. A report issued by now-ranking Republican Ken Buck as a rejoinder to last year’s Democratic House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee staff report on competition in digital markets allowed that the GOP shares other Democratic concerns, including predatory pricing, monopoly leveraging and control over marketplace platforms. That conciliatory signal also came weighted, with warnings that Congress should be wary of “handing additional regulatory to agencies in an attempt to micromanage.” Instead, try instead telling enforcers they should return to first principles, the Colorado lawmaker advised. Whether Republicans and Democrats in the Senate can find common cause is an even more fraught question. Unlike its House counterpart, the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on antitrust hasn't conducted a 16-month investigation into digital monopolization. The subcommittee’s senior Republican, Utah’s Mike Lee, is prone to touting the importance of the consumer welfare standard and rails against online platforms “eager to impose the ideological censorship called for by their political benefactors.” Lee also says he’s open to working with subcommittee Chairwoman Amy Klobuchar on strengthening enforcement, adding the caveat that current antitrust laws are sufficient. Klobuchar, a Minnesota Democrat, doesn’t need Lee to get a bill through her subcommittee, but failing to find consensus with Republicans imperils her chances of making law. The prospects for her Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act becoming law as current written aren't good. — 'Big tech is out to get conservatives' — A looming question hanging over any bill, even one tailored to win bipartisan support, is whether it could be derailed by Republican anger at online platforms for alleged anti-conservative bias. A right-wing trope especially spread by President Donald Trump during his last year in office — the belief that platforms use their content moderation powers to silence conservatives — has mainstream acceptance in Republican circles. It’s a refrain almost obligatory for Republican lawmakers to repeat when discussing any issue related to online platforms. “Big tech is out to get conservatives,” House Judiciary Committee ranking member Jim Jordan of Ohio has said more than once. Democrats have their own share of anger at online platforms’ content-moderation practices, to be sure. They accuse online platforms of circumventing consumer protections, undermining civil rights laws and not doing enough to stymie disinformation. It’s Republicans, though, who appear the angriest, and are the more likely to insist that any legislative reform touching online platforms address content moderation, with the intention of making it harder, not easier, for online platforms to remove users, potentially imperiling a compromise measure.

#### That allows the GOP to successfully weaponize misinformation---triggers epistemic decay and cements a perma-GOP government

Carpenter 21, contributing writer for The Nation. She received the James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism in 2018, and has been a finalist for the Livingston Awards and the National Awards for Education Reporting. Her writing has also appeared in Rolling Stone, Guernica, and various other publications (Zoe, “Misinformation Is Destroying Our Country. Can Anything Rein It In?,” *The Nation*, <https://www.thenation.com/article/society/right-wing-media-misinformation/>)

Natali Fierros Bock says she could feel this mass delusion calcifying in the wake of the election in Pinal County, a rural area between Phoenix and Tucson where she serves as co–executive director of the group Rural Arizona Engagement. “It feels like an existential crisis,” Bock adds. Many of the Sharpiegate claims online referred to Pinal County, and Gosar, whose district includes a portion of the area, was reportedly responsible for helping organize the January 6 “Stop the Steal” rally in Washington that resulted in the deaths of five people. Mark Finchem, a Republican who represents part of Pinal County in the statehouse, was also in Washington on January 6. The Capitol insurrection threw into relief the real-world consequences of America’s increasingly siloed media ecosystem, which is characterized on the right by an expanding web of outlets and platforms willing to entertain an alternative version of reality. Social media companies, confronted with their role in spreading misinformation, scrambled to implement reforms. But right-wing misinformation is not just a technological problem, and it is far from being fixed. Any hope that the events of January 6 might provoke a reckoning within conservative media and the Republican Party has by now evaporated. The GOP remains eager to weaponize misinformation, not only to win elections but also to advance its policy agenda. A prime example is the aggressive effort under way in a number of states to restrict access to the ballot. In Arizona, Republicans have introduced nearly two dozen bills that would make it more difficult to vote, with the big lie about election fraud as a pretext. “When you can sell somebody the idea that their elections were stolen, they’ve been violated, right? So then you need protection,” Bock says, explaining the conservative justification for the suite of new restrictions in her state. Voting rights is her organization’s “number one concern” at the moment. But Bock’s fears about political misinformation are more sweeping. Community organizing is difficult in the best of times. “But when you can’t agree on what is true and not true, when my reality doesn’t match the reality of the person I’m speaking to, it makes it more difficult to find common ground,” she says. “If we can’t agree on a common truth, if we can’t find a starting place, then how does it end?” Around the time of the 2016 election, Kate Starbird, a professor at the University of Washington who studies misinformation during crises, noticed that more and more social media users were incorporating markers of political identity into their online personas—hashtags and memes and other signifiers of their ideological alignment. In the footage from the Capitol she saw the same symbols, outfits, and flags as those she’d been watching spread in far-right communities online. “To see those caricatures come alive in this violent riot or insurrection, whatever you want to call it, was horrifying, but it was all very recognizable for me,” Starbird says. “There was a time in which we were like, ‘Oh, those are bots, those aren’t real people,’ or ‘That’s someone play-acting,’ or ‘We’re putting on our online persona and that doesn’t really reflect who we are in an offline sense.’ January 6 pretty much disabused us of that notion.” It was a particularly rude awakening for social media companies, which had long been reluctant to respond to the misinformation that flourished on their platforms, treating it as an issue of speech that could be divorced from real-world consequences. Facebook, Twitter, and other platforms had made some changes in anticipation of a contested election, announcing plans to label or remove content delegitimizing election results, for instance. Facebook blocked new campaign ads for the week leading up to the election; Twitter labeled hundreds of thousands of misleading tweets with fact-checking notes. Yet wild claims about election fraud spread virally anyway, ping-ponging from individual social media users to right-wing influencers and media. During the 2016 campaign, most public concern about misinformation centered on shadowy foreign actors posing as news sources or US citizens. This turned out to be an oversimplification, though many on the center and left offered it as an explanation for Hillary Clinton’s defeat in 2016; blaming Russian state actors alone ignored factors like sexism, missteps made by the Clinton campaign itself, and the home-grown feedback loop of right-wing media. In 2020, according to research done by Starbird and other contributors to the Election Integrity Project, those most influential in disseminating misinformation were largely verified, “blue check” social media users who were authentic, in the sense that they were who they said they were—Donald Trump, for example, and his adult sons. DONATE NOW TO POWER THE NATION. Readers like you make our independent journalism possible. Another key aspect in the creation of the big lie was what Starbird calls “participatory disinformation.” Trump was tweeting about the election being stolen from him months beforehand, but once voting got under way, “what we see is that he kind of relies on the crowd, the audiences, to create the evidence to fit the frame,” Starbird explains. Individuals posted their personal experiences online, which were shared by more influential accounts and eventually featured in media stories that placed the anecdotes within the broader narrative of a stolen election. Some of the anecdotes that fueled Sharpiegate came from people who used a felt-tip pen to vote in person, then saw online that their vote had been canceled—though the “canceled” vote actually referred to mail-in ballots that voters had requested before deciding to vote in person. “It’s a really powerful kind of propaganda, because the people that were helping to create these narratives really did think they were experiencing fraud,” Starbird says. Action by content moderators usually came too late and was complicated by the fact that many claims of disenfranchisement by individual users were difficult to verify or disprove. The Capitol riot led the tech giants to take more aggressive action against Trump and other peddlers of misinformation. Twitter and Facebook kicked Trump off their platforms and shut down tens of thousands of accounts and pages. Facebook clamped down on some of its groups, which the company’s own data scientists had previously warned were incubating misinformation and “enthusiastic calls for violence,” according to an internal presentation. Google and Apple booted Parler, a social media site used primarily by the far right, from their app stores, and Amazon stopped hosting Parler’s data on its cloud infrastructure system, forcing it temporarily offline. But these measures were largely reactions to harm already done. “Moderation doesn’t reduce the demand for [misleading] content, and demand for that content has grown during some periods of time when the platforms weren’t moderating or weren’t addressing some of the more egregious ways their tools were abused,” says Renée DiResta, technical research manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory. Deplatforming individuals or denying service to companies that tolerate violent rhetoric, as Amazon did with Parler, can have an impact, particularly in the short term and when done at scale. It reduces the reach of influential liars and can make it more difficult for “alt-tech” apps to operate. A notorious example of deplatforming involved Alex Jones, the conspiracy theorist behind the site Infowars. Jones was kicked off Apple, Facebook, YouTube, and Spotify in 2018 for his repeated endorsement of violence. He lost nearly 2.5 million subscribers on YouTube alone, and in the three weeks after his accounts were cut off, Infowars’ daily average visits dropped from close to 1.4 million to 715,000. But Jones didn’t disappear—he migrated to Parler, Gab, and other alt-tech platforms, and he spoke at a rally in Washington the night before the Capitol attack. One outcome of unplugging Trump and other right-wing influencers has been a surge of interest in those alternative social media platforms, where more dangerous echo chambers can form and, in encrypted spaces, be more difficult to monitor. “Isn’t this just going to make the extreme communities worse? Yes,” says Ethan Zuckerman, founder of the Institute for Digital Public Infrastructure at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. “But we’re already headed there, and at least the good news is that [extremists] aren’t going to be recruiting in these mainstream spaces.” The bad news, in Zuckerman’s view, is that the far right is now leading the effort to create new forms of online community. “The Nazis right now have an incentive to build alternative distributed media, and the rest of us are behind, because we don’t have the incentive to do it,” Zuckerman explains. He argues that a digital infrastructure that is smaller, distributed, and not-for-profit is the path to a better Internet. “And my real deep fear is that we end up ceding the design of this way of building social networks to far-right extremists, because they are the ones who need these new spaces to discuss and organize.” In March, Trump spokesman Jason Miller said on Fox that the former president was likely to return to social media this spring “with his own platform.” A more fundamental problem than Trump’s presence or absence on Twitter is the power that a single executive—Jack Dorsey, in the case of Twitter—has in making that decision. Social media companies have become so big that they have little fear of accountability in the form of competition. “To put it simply, companies that once were scrappy, underdog startups that challenged the status quo have become the kinds of monopolies we last saw in the era of oil barons and railroad tycoons,” concluded a recent report by the staff of the Democratic members of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust. For now, the reforms at Facebook and other companies remain largely superficial. The platforms are still based on algorithms that reward outrageous content and are still financed via the collection and sale of user data. Karen Hao of MIT Technology Review recently reported that a former Facebook AI researcher told her “his team conducted ‘study after study’ confirming the same basic idea: models that maximize engagement increase polarization.” Hao’s investigation concluded that Facebook leadership’s relentless pursuit of growth “repeatedly weakened or halted many initiatives meant to clean up misinformation on the platform.” The modest “break glass” measures Facebook took during the election in response to the swell of misinformation, which included tweaks to its ranking algorithm to emphasize news sources it considered “authoritative,” have already been reversed. Tech companies could do more, as the election-time tweaks revealed. But they still “refuse to see misinformation as a core feature of their product,” says Joan Donovan, research director for the Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University. The problem of misinformation appears so vast “because that’s exactly what the technology allows.” There are some signs of a growing appetite for regulation on Capitol Hill. Democrats have proposed reforms to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which insulates tech companies from legal liability for content posted to their platforms, such as requiring more transparency about content moderation and opening platforms to lawsuits in limited circumstances when content causes real-world harm. (GOP critiques of Section 230, on the other hand, make the false argument that it allows platforms to discriminate against conservatives.) Another legislative tactic would focus on the algorithms that platforms use to amplify content, rather than on the content itself. A bill introduced by two House Democrats would make companies liable if their algorithms promote content linked to acts of violence. Democratic lawmakers are also eyeing changes to antitrust law, while several antitrust lawsuits have been filed against Facebook and Google. But litigation could take years. Even breaking up Big Tech would leave intact its predatory business model. To address this, Zuckerman and other experts have called for a tax on targeted digital advertising. Such a tax would discourage targeted advertising, and the revenue could be used to fund public-service media. Held to account? Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey testified remotely before the Senate Judiciary Committee in November 2020. (Matt York / AP) Social media plays a key role in amplifying conspiracy theories and political misinformation, but it didn’t create them. “When we think of disinformation as something that appeared [only in the Trump era], and that we used to have this agreed-upon narrative of what was true and then social platforms came into the picture and now that’s all fragmented… that makes a lot of assumptions about the idea that everyone used to agree on what was true and what was false,” says Alice E. Marwick, an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina who studies social media and society. Politicians have long leveraged misinformation, particularly racist tropes. But it’s been made particularly potent not just by social media, Marwick argues, but by the right-wing media industry that profits from lies. “The American online public sphere is a shambles because it was grafted onto a television and radio public sphere that was already deeply broken,” argue Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, and Hal Roberts of Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society in their book Network Propaganda. The collapse of local news left a vacuum that for many Americans has been filled by partisan outlets that, on the right, are characterized by blatant disregard for journalistic standards of sourcing and verification. This insulated world of right-wing outlets, which stretches from those that bill themselves as objective sources, Fox News chief among them, to talk radio and extreme sites like Infowars and The Gateway Pundit, “represents a radicalization of roughly a third of the American media system,” the authors write. The conservative movement spent decades building this apparatus to peddle lies and fear along with miracle cures and pyramid schemes, and was so successful that Fox and other far-right outlets ended up in a tight two-step with the White House. Fox chairman Rupert Murdoch maintained a close relationship with Trump, as did Sean Hannity and former Fox News copresident Bill Shine, who became White House communications director in 2018. The backlash against Fox in the wake of the election hinted at a possible dethroning of the ruler of the right’s media machine. Its farther-right rival Newsmax TV posted a higher rating than Fox for the first time ever in the month after the election, following supportive tweets from Trump, and during the week of November 9 it passed Breitbart as the most-visited conservative website. But Fox quickly regained its perch. The network backpedaled rapidly during its post-election ratings slump, firing an editor who’d defended the projection of a Biden win in Arizona and replacing news programming with opinion content. According to Media Matters, Fox News pushed the idea of a stolen election nearly 800 times in the two weeks after declaring Biden the winner. The network’s ad revenue increased 31 percent during the final quarter of 2020, while its parent company, Fox Corporation, saw a 17 percent jump in pretax profit. The far-right media ecosystem has become so powerful in part because there’s been no downside to lying. Instead, the Trump administration demonstrated that there was a market opportunity in serving up misinformation that purports to back up what people want to believe. “In this day and age, people want something that tends to affirm their views and opinions,” Newsmax CEO Chris Ruddy told The New York Times’ Ben Smith in an interview published shortly after the election. Claims of a rigged election were “great for news,” he said in another interview. Trump’s departure from the White House won’t necessarily reduce the demand for this kind of content. Since the Capitol riot, two voting-systems companies have launched an unusual effort to hold right-wing outlets and influencers accountable for some of the lies they’ve spread. Dominion Voting Systems, a major provider of voting technology, and another company called Smartmatic were the subjects of myriad outlandish claims related to election fraud, many of which were used in lawsuits filed by Trump’s campaign and were repeatedly broadcast on Fox, Newsmax TV, and OAN. Since January the companies have filed several defamation suits against Trump campaign lawyers Sidney Powell and Rudy Giuliani, MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell, and Fox News and three of its hosts. Dominion alleges that as a result of false accusations, its “founder and employees have been harassed and have received death threats, and Dominion has suffered unprecedented and irreparable harm.” The threat of legal action forced a number of media companies to issue corrections for stories about supposed election meddling that mentioned Dominion. The conservative website American Thinker published a statement admitting its stories about Dominion were “completely false and have no basis in fact” and “rel[ied] on discredited sources who have peddled debunked theories.” OAN simply deleted all of the stories about Dominion from its website without comment. These lawsuits will not dismantle the world of right-wing media, but they have prompted a more robust debate about how media and social media companies could be held liable for lies that turn lethal—and whether this type of legal action should be pursued, given the protections afforded by the First Amendment and the fact that the powerful often use libel law to bully journalists. Alternative reality: Trump supporters in Maricopa County derided Fox for reporting on election night that Biden had won the state. (Hannah McKay / Pool / Getty Images) Ethan Zuckerman has been thinking about how to build a better Internet for years, a preoccupation not unrelated to the fact that, in the 1990s, he wrote the code that created pop-up ads. (“I’m sorry. Our intentions were good,” he wrote in 2014.) Still, he believes that framing misinformation as a problem of media and technology is myopic. “It’s very hard to conclude that this is purely an informational problem,” Zuckerman says. “It’s a power problem.” The GOP is increasingly tolerant of, and even reliant on, weaponized misinformation. “We’re in a place where the Republican Party realizes that as much as 70 percent of their voters don’t believe that Biden was legitimately elected, and they are now deeply reluctant to contradict what their voters believe,” Zuckerman says. Republicans are reluctant, at least in part, because of a legitimate fear of primary challenges from the right, but also because they learned from Trump the power of using conspiracy theories to mobilize alienated voters by preying on their deep mistrust of public institutions. It’s one thing for an ordinary citizen to retweet a false claim; it’s another for elected officials to legitimize conspiracy theories. But holding the GOP to account may prove to be even harder than reforming Big Tech. The radical grass roots have been empowered by small-dollar fundraising and gerrymandering, while more moderate Republicans are retiring or leaving the party. Writer Erick Trickey argued recently in The Washington Post that what undercut a similar wave of conservative crackpot paranoia driven by the John Birch Society in the 1960s was explicit denunciation by prominent conservatives like William Buckley and Ronald Reagan as well as Republican congressional leaders. But today’s party leaders have been unwilling to excommunicate conspiracy-mongers. In the aftermath of the Capitol riot, elected officials who spread rumors that the violence was actually the result of antifascists—including Arizona’s Paul Gosar and Andy Biggs—gained notoriety, while those critical of Trump were publicly humiliated. The embrace of conspiratorial narratives has been particularly pronounced in state GOP organizations. The Texas GOP recently incorporated the QAnon slogan “We are the storm” into official publicity media, and the Oregon GOP’s executive committee endorsed the theory that the riot had been a “false flag” operation. In March, members of the Oregon GOP voted to replace its Trump-supporting chairman with a candidate even farther out on the extremist fringe. 0;pi; aWeaponized misinformation could have a lasting impact not only on the shape of the GOP but also on public policy. Republicans are now using the big lie to try to restrict voting rights in Arizona, Georgia, and dozens of other states. As of February 19, according to the Brennan Center for Justice, lawmakers in 43 states had introduced more than 250 bills restricting access to voting, “over seven times the number of restrictive bills as compared to roughly this time last year.” In late March, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp signed a 95-page bill making it harder to vote in that state in a number of ways. Many of the far-right extremists, politicians, and media influencers who spread misinformation about the presidential election are now pushing falsehoods about Covid-19 vaccines. The rumors, which have spread on social media apps like Telegram that are frequented by QAnon adherents and militia groups, among others, range from standard anti-vax talking points to absurd claims that the vaccines are part of a secret plan hatched by Bill Gates to implant trackable microchips, or that they cause infertility or alter human DNA. Sidestepping the craziest conspiracies, prominent conservatives like Tucker Carlson and Wisconsin Senator Ron Johnson, who has become one of the GOP’s leading purveyors of misinformation, are casting doubt about vaccine safety under the pretense of “just asking questions.” Vaccine misinformation plays into the longstanding conservative effort to sow mistrust in government, and it appears to be having an effect: A third of Republicans now say they don’t want to get vaccinated. These are the true costs of misinformation: deadly riots, policy changes that could disenfranchise legitimate voters, scores of preventable deaths. These translate into financial externalities: the additional expense of securing the Capitol, additional dollars devoted to the pandemic response. More abstract but no less real are the social costs: the parents lost down QAnon rabbit holes, the erosion of factual foundations that permit productive argument. The problem with the far right’s universe of “alternative facts” is not that it’s hermetically sealed from the universe the rest of us live in. Rather, it’s that these universes cannot truly be separated. If we’ve learned anything in the past six months, it’s that epistemological distance doesn’t prevent collisions in the real world that can be lethal to individuals—and potentially ruinous for democratic systems.

#### Disinformation undermines collective responses to existential threats

Roston 21, citing Bak-Coleman, PhD, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Washington Center for an Informed Public (Eric, “As Climate Change Fries the World, Social Media Is Frying Our Brains,” *Bloomberg News*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-29/as-climate-change-fries-the-world-social-media-is-frying-our-brains>)

Amid emergency heat, flooding, and famine, it’s even more critical that people recognize and agree at least on the big picture. And yet, as recent history has shown us time and again, they don’t. Much of that can be blamed on the pandemic of misinformation—concerning climate change, Covid-19, vaccines, and so much more— now running rampant on social media. It reminds Joseph Bak-Coleman of fish. Bak-Coleman is the lead author of a provocative new article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences about scientists’ inability thus far to adequately inform policymakers about how digital technology is impeding efforts to solve climate change and other collective-behavior problems. Individual fish swimming in a school intuit each other so rapidly and clearly that they can instantaneously and in unison pivot away from whatever dangers they encounter. Insofar as that is true, they have a limited error margin for passing along bad information. “It costs energy when you get scared for no reason, and it also costs life if you don’t get scared when you should,” said Bak-Coleman, a University of Washington postdoctoral scholar with expertise in neuroscience and evolutionary biology. “Animal groups are highly tuned to do these really fantastic feats of behavior. But it’s all quite fragile.” The development of digital communications has eroded or vaporized community protections developed over millennia to ensure at least a minimally healthy flow of information, which leads to healthy decision-making. That loss, Bak-Coleman and his co-authors write, “combined with rapid distribution of falsehood, may present one of the larger threats to human well-being.” Think of it like this. If you wanted to make the most obvious statement in the world, you could do worse than: “Technology now allows people to communicate instantaneously and across great distances.” Yet if you wanted to elicit the most tortured answer in the world, you might ask something incredibly similar: “What happens when people can communicate instantaneously and across great distances?” The tension between the obvious statement and the unanswerable question—which holds within it just about all of the world’s large-scale problems, including climate change—is so great, Bak-Coleman and his colleagues propose a whole new academic discipline just to try to understand it. As physiology has medicine and climate science has emissions-mitigation and adaptation–planning, they argue, the digital-misinformation pandemic requires an applied science—or as they call it, a “crisis discipline.” The need for such a discipline is also urgent, they argue, because “given that algorithms and companies are already altering our global patterns of behavior for financial reasons, there is no safe hands-off approach.” Despite the many joys and productive uses of digital communication, it routinely conveys so many falsehoods, so quickly, that many people are left either unable to see or unwilling to fix existential dilemmas, leaving humanity overall in a precarious condition.

## ADV 1

### 1NC

#### Industrial animal production is less greenhouse gas-intensive than alternatives

Nordhaus & Blaustein-Rejto, Breakthrough Institute researchers, ’21

[Ted Nordhaus, Executive Director, Breakthrough Institute and Dan Blaustein-Rejto, Director, Food and Agriculture, Breakthrough Institute, “Small Farms, Big Pollution,” FOREIGN POLICY, 6—2—21, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/06/02/big-agriculture-pollution-small-farms-inefficient/, accessed 6-8-21]

Questionable claims keep coming. Sanderson and Cox attribute the 14.5 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions that result from animal agriculture to the scaling up of industrial agriculture. But a significant majority of greenhouse gas emissions associated with animal agriculture result from beef and dairy production. Around the world, only 15 percent of beef production is produced intensively. Moreover, most studies find that industrial animal production is less greenhouse gas intensive than alternative production systems.

#### Global topsoil restoration is effective now---solves the impact

Joe Fontaine 15, Lecturer in Environmental Science, Murdoch University, Australia, et al, 2/12/15, “Evaluating restoration potential of transferred topsoil,” Applied Vegetation Science, DOI: 10.1111/avsc.12162

As biodiversity conservation becomes ever more important on a global scale, restoration is being used increasingly as a tool to temper ecological impacts of development and land-use change (Hobbs et al. 2011; McCarthy et al. 2012), and simply conserving remaining natural areas is no longer sufficient to meet conservation goals (Grimm et al. 2008; McCarthy et al. 2012). While complete restoration of degraded ecosystems rarely is a realistic goal (Hobbs 2007), evidence exists that some taxa, ecological functions and ecosystem services may be returned (Benayas et al. 2009). Therefore, increasing the knowledge and capacity to restore larger proportions of taxa in degraded sites is urgently needed, particularly in biodiversity hotspot regions (Myers et al. 2000).

Ecological restoration is a relatively young science with a rapidly expanding literature investigating restoration capacity (e.g. Ruthrof et al. 2013) as well as debating its efficacy and context for biodiversity conservation (Shackelford et al. 2013). While restoration objectives vary widely, one of the most common is to return native vegetation to degraded sites. Methods for returning vegetation most often involve two distinct approaches; the planting of nursery-raised seedlings, and/or the direct seeding of native species seed mixes. Both of these methods require significant inputs of labour and technical knowledge (i.e. seed collection and storage, germination, propagation, greenhouse use, planting techniques, etc.). A third method, topsoil transfer, the moving of topsoil containing ungerminated but viable soil-stored seeds and other propagules – potentially in high numbers – from newly cleared natural areas to degraded restoration sites, offers the potential to return more species to sites with shorter lag times and lower labour and technical inputs (Koch 2007b). Topsoil transfer has been utilized as a restoration technique in many regions globally, including Spain (Tormo et al. 2007), Japan (Hosogi & Kameyama 2004), Norway (Skrindo & Pedersen 2004), Brazil (Parrotta & Knowles 2001), France (Vécrin & Muller 2003), South Africa (van Rooyen et al. 2004) and Australia (Koch 2007a).

The use of topsoil transfer as a restoration technique has increased in recent years as a tool for post-mining restoration (Parrotta & Knowles 2001; van Rooyen et al. 2004; Koch 2007b), roadside restoration (Skrindo & Pedersen 2004; Tormo et al. 2007), restoring degraded farmland (Vécrin & Muller 2003) and increasing biodiversity in urban areas (Hosogi & Kameyama 2004). While topsoil transfer may offer other benefits (e.g. burying weed seed banks, providing beneficial soil organisms, etc.) the principal motivation has been driven by seed banks (Koch 2007b). Topsoil transfer is particularly appealing in regions characterized by high rates of seed dormancy and high plant diversity (e.g. Mediterranean and other fire-prone regions) where technical knowledge (seed characteristics, propagation methods) may extend to only a small portion of the plant community. Under such circumstances, topsoil transfer has the potential to return many otherwise poorly represented species to restoration sites in an economical manner.

#### Only revolution accesses the speed and scale of change necessary to forestall extinction.

Foster 12-1-2021, \*John Bellamy, PhD, professor of sociology @ the University of Oregon. \*\*John Molyneux, edits the Irish Marxist Review, member of People Before Profit, coordinator of the Global Ecosocialist Network. \*\*\*Owen McCormack, longstanding socialist activist. He is a bus driver who has also worked as a parliamentary researcher for People Before Profit. ("Against Doomsday Scenarios: What Is to Be Done Now?", *Monthly Review*, <https://monthlyreview.org/2021/12/01/against-doomsday-scenarios/>) \*Initials denote the speaker; the first few paragraphs are Foster

JM/OM: Is there still time to avert disaster? Do you have any hope that existing powers and the present system will be able to avert the catastrophe of runaway climate change? Will they even seriously try? Some people are giving Biden a certain amount of credit for moving in the right direction—what do you think?

JBF: We are now in a position, as I have indicated, where what we can only call catastrophic developments associated with the crossing of planetary boundaries (namely, climate change, the decline of biological diversity, ocean acidification, the disruption of the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, the elimination of ground cover, the loss of freshwater, chemical pollution, and so on) are unavoidable. The COVID-19 pandemic is itself a manifestation of the destruction of ecological systems by agribusiness, which is bound to create new zoonoses, transmitted by the circuits of capital. But climate change represents at present our most serious problem because of the speed with which it is developing and its irreversible character, often likened to a tipping point leading over the edge of a cliff (as much as some like Mann may dislike the metaphor). We are in a dangerous situation. But we can still avoid such dire, irreversible consequences, likely fatal to humanity, if sufficient social action is taken, allowing us to stop short of what scientists have designated as the climate tipping point (usually now thought of as requiring to stay below 1.5°C, or at most below 2°C, although this is inherently inexact).

But this is only possible, as the leaked Part 3 of the Sixth Assessment Report (not scheduled for publication until March, and then in redacted form), on “Mitigation,” tells us, if we are willing to carry out fundamental structural change. And, as the report also informs us, at this point we would need to alter dramatically the “demand-side” of the equation, that is, the amount and structure of what is produced and consumed, including a shift to low-energy paths, rather than simply counting on the massive ecomodernization of energy systems, much less new technologies that do not exist at scale. Time is so short that the demand-side strategies, which require challenging the current production system, are the only changes that can be effected rapidly enough and on the scale required.

In my view, the best historical analogy for the present world situation is Cuba’s Special Period following the demise of the Soviet Union. All at once in the early 1990s, Cuba had to do without the massive fossil fuel inputs (and petrochemical inputs) from the USSR on which its economy had come to depend. Fortunately, as the dialectical biologist Richard Levins explained, Cuba had seen the growth of ecological science in the form of “ecologists by conviction” of extraordinary ability, who were then joined in the Special Period by “ecologists by necessity.” Despite the U.S. blockade, Cuba was able to provide for its basic agricultural needs and reconstruct its economy based on organic agriculture and the development of socialist ecological science, creating a better society. This meant of course increased pressure on the population due to the external pressures they were under and the loss of external resources coming from the previous Eastern bloc. But Cuba in large part succeeded, in the process turning itself into the most ecological nation on earth (according to The Living Planet Report), while protecting and even increasing the quality of its human development. Tragically, it is Cuba’s success that has caused Washington in recent years to tighten the blockade, utilizing the methods of financial war. None of this, however, takes away from the depth of Cuba’s achievement.

#### Their Tam and Beilskis ev is their main solvency ev—that’s written by undergrads, we’ll insert this

Graphical user interface, text, application, email

Description automatically generated

#### Courts circumvent.

Newman 19, University of Miami School of Law professor and a former attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division. (John, 4-5-2019, "What Democratic Contenders Are Missing in the Race to Revive Antitrust", *Atlantic*, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/what-2020-democratic-candidates-miss-about-antitrust/586135/)

But the federal courts represent a massive stumbling block for any progressive antitrust movement. Reformers have identified two paths forward; both lead eventually to the court system. The first is relatively moderate: appoint regulators who will actually enforce the laws already on the books. Warren’s plan rests in part on this straightforward idea. The second, more audacious path requires congressional action to amend and strengthen our current laws. Warren’s call for a new ban on technology companies’ buying and selling via their own platforms falls into this category. Klobuchar has also proposed new antitrust legislation that would make it easier to block harmful mergers and acquisitions. But no matter its content, enforcing a law requires persuading a judge. When it comes to U.S. antitrust laws, federal judges—not Congress, and not regulatory agencies—are the ultimate arbiters. The Department of Justice Antitrust Division, one of our two public enforcement agencies, files all its cases in federal courts. And although the Federal Trade Commission (the other) can decide cases internally, the inevitable appeals eventually end up in court as well. No matter how strongly worded a law may be, ideologically driven judges can usually find a way around enforcing it. The cyclical history of U.S. antitrust law is proof that judges wield nearly limitless institutional power in this area. Soon after Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890, a conservative Supreme Court began to chip away at its effectiveness. Congress reacted in 1914 with the Clayton Act, which sought to ban anticompetitive mergers. In 1936, at the height of the New Deal era, Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits price discrimination (charging different prices to different buyers for the same product). These laws were actively enforced for decades. But starting in the late 1970s, conservative judges began to erode the Clayton Act. Today, megamergers among competitors such as Bayer and Monsanto barely raise eyebrows. So-called vertical mergers, which combine suppliers and their customers, are now all but immune from antitrust enforcement—see the DOJ’s failed challenge to AT&T and Time Warner’s recent tie-up. Under the business-friendly Roberts Court, the Robinson-Patman Act has similarly been eviscerated. By the 2000s, the ideas of the conservative Chicago School had become mainstream in antitrust circles. Robinson-Patman, a law intended to protect small businesses, was an easy target for Chicago School critics narrowly focused on efficiency and low consumer prices. Their attacks found a receptive audience in the federal judiciary. Among insiders, Robinson-Patman is now known as “zombie law.” It remains on the books, but regulators no longer bother trying to enforce it. If Democrats want to change antitrust law, they will first and foremost need to change the judges who apply it. Yet none of the 2020 contenders championing antitrust reform have even mentioned the possibility of appointing progressive antitrust thinkers to the bench. Conservatives, on the other hand, have long recognized the centrality of antitrust to broader questions about the apportionment of power in society. In his seminal work, The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork called antitrust a “microcosm in which larger movements of our society are reflected.” Battles fought in this arena, Bork wrote, “are likely to affect the outcome of parallel struggles in others.” Strong antitrust enforcement keeps powerful monopolies in check. Toothless antitrust allows the unlimited accumulation of corporate power. Recognizing the high stakes, the Republican Party has gone to great lengths to appoint conservative antitrust experts to the federal judiciary. Bork was an antitrust professor at Yale Law School before becoming an appellate judge in 1982.\* Frank Easterbrook practiced and taught antitrust before donning the black robe in 1985. Douglas Ginsburg served as the head of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division before he became a federal judge in 1986. None of the three managed to join the Supreme Court, but not for lack of trying. Reagan nominated both Bork and Ginsburg to serve as justices, though Ginsburg withdrew and Bork was famously rejected after a contentious Senate hearing. And whom did the GOP select as its very first U.S. Supreme Court nominee during the Trump Administration? None other than Neil Gorsuch, who practiced antitrust law for more than a decade before joining the Tenth Circuit. Even as a judge, Gorsuch continued to teach a law-school course on antitrust until his confirmation to the Supreme Court in 2017. Once upon a time, progressives demonstrated similar concern about judicial treatment of antitrust laws. Justice Stephen Breyer, for example, served as special assistant to the head of the DOJ Antitrust Division before his judicial appointment by President Jimmy Carter. Earlier still, Justice John Paul Stevens was an antitrust lawyer, scholar, and professor before his appointment to the bench. Today’s Democratic 2020 hopefuls seem to have forgotten the lessons of history. Their antitrust proposals focus exclusively on appointing the right regulators and amending our current statutes. These are right-minded ideas, but they overlook the central role judges play in our political system. There is an old saying in the legal community: “Hard cases make bad law.” That may be true, but it is just as often the case that bad judges make bad law. Real antitrust reform will require more than regulatory and legislative tweaks; it will require the right judges.

#### Solvency takes decades, and big ag rebounds.

Fukuyama et al. 21, \*Francis, Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. \*\*Barak Richman, Katharine T. Bartlett Professor of Law and Professor of Business Administration at Duke University School of Law. \*\*\*Ashish Goel, Professor of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University. They are members of the Working Group on Platform Scale for Stanford University’s Program on Democracy and the Internet. (January/February 2021, "How to Save Democracy From Technology", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-11-24/fukuyama-how-save-democracy-technology)

Another approach to checking Internet platforms’ power is to promote greater competition. If there were a multiplicity of platforms, none would have the dominance enjoyed by Facebook and Google today. The problem, however, is that neither the United States nor the EU could likely break up Facebook or Google the way that Standard Oil and AT&T were broken up. Today’s technology companies would fiercely resist such an attempt, and even if they eventually lost, the process of breaking them up would take years, if not decades, to complete. Perhaps more important, it is not clear that breaking up Facebook, for example, would solve the underlying problem. There is a very good chance that a baby Facebook created by such a breakup would quickly grow to replace the parent. Even AT&T regained its dominance after being broken up in the 1980s. Social media’s rapid scalability would make that happen even faster.

#### Resource constraints prevent small farms and coops from pursuing sustainable ag.

Carlisle et al 19, Environmental Studies Program, University of California, Santa Barbara, Liz, Transitioning to Sustainable Agriculture Requires Growing and Sustaining an Ecologically Skilled Workforce, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsufs.2019.00096/full#B35

Barriers to Becoming a Sustainable Farmer The first step toward growing an agroecologically-skilled workforce involves reducing the initial barriers to entry into farming, which may be even more challenging for farmers hoping to embrace such practices. One of the biggest barriers faced by would-be farmers is acquiring or gaining access to land, particularly land with adequate access to water. As development pressures and policies favor “productive” purposes like housing and infrastructure, national farmland acreage nationwide has decreased, often irreversibly. A recent report on farmland loss estimates a reduction of 31 million acres between 1992 and 2012 (American Farmland Trust, 2018), with African American and Native American farmers disproportionately affected by land loss (Dunbar-Ortiz, 2014; Newkirk, 2019). In California alone, 1.4 million acres of farm and grazing land were lost between 1984 and 2014, a decrease of about 50,000 acres per year (California Department of Conservation, 2019). That trend appears to be accelerating still further: according to the new USDA Agricultural Census, between 2012 and 2017, California land in farms declined by an average of 209,240 acres per year. In parallel—and perhaps as a result—remaining US farmland has steadily increased in value, with croplands doubling in appreciation in the 2004–2014 period (USDA NASS, 2017). The aging farm population would appear to present an opportunity for new farmers (including farm workers) to buy out retirees, but without robust land use policies, much of this farmland is instead being transferred to institutional investors, which means new farmers are more likely to be tenants than farmland owners (Calo and De Master, 2016). As tenants, farmers have less autonomy to make long-term management decisions—decisions which may pose a relatively greater challenge for farmers interested in pursuing agroecology. For example, tenant farmers may not be in a position to invest in perennial crops, conservation infrastructure, or soil health (Calo and De Master, 2016). Land is not the only major asset for which new farmers require staggering amounts of up-front capital: equipment, operating costs, and proper storage and post-handling facilities can require millions of dollars before farmers harvest their first crop (Schiller, 2017). These costs may be even higher for biologically diversified farms, as they tend to require more diverse and appropriately scaled equipment that may be used only at certain times of the year or only for specific crops. These farms also need to make upfront investments in soil health and ecosystem function, such as soil-building cover crops, compost applications, and hedgerows. Over time, these investments can reduce input costs and production risk, while boosting fertility, carbon sequestration potential, and drought resilience. But their economic benefits may not be realized for years, while farmers can face initial production risks from switching to new practices. Moreover, new farmers have few options for financing such investments without incurring significant debt, and new farmers using ecologically-informed management are particularly poorly served by federal crop insurance subsidies, half of which go to farms in the top 10% of crop sales (Belasco, 2017) and many of which undervalue or even deter sustainable farming practices (Woodard and Verteramo-Chiu, 2017).

#### Adding new standards to consumer welfare forces arbitrary and conflicting decisions---that triggers regulatory capture and zeroes compliance

Melamed 20, Professor of the Practice of Law, Stanford Law School. (A. Douglas, “ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS CRITICS”, 83 ANTITRUST L.J., pg. 15-16, <https://lisboncouncil.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/MELAMED-Antitrust-Law-and-Its-Critics.pdf>)

Perhaps more important, the institutions of antitrust law are not well suited to address multiple and often conflicting objectives. Antitrust law is enforced on a case-by-case basis. Were antitrust law to serve multiple objectives, it would need criteria to guide decisions in the many instances when those objectives would conflict. There is, however, no algorithm for weighting inequality or political power, on the one hand, against economic welfare, on the other.86 There is not even a common metric for measuring them. Absent such a metric or algorithm, antitrust decisions would necessarily be arbitrary and perceived as arbitrary.

That would have three serious costs. First, if antitrust decisions are perceived as arbitrary, the widespread legitimacy of antitrust law would erode. The antitrust laws were first passed in 1890, and the most important statutory provisions are more than one hundred years old. It is not an accident that populist critics have expressed their concerns largely in antitrust terms. The perpetuation of that legitimacy cannot be taken for granted.

Second, if antitrust decisions are perceived as being arbitrary, they will be more easily subject to regulatory capture because there will not be seemingly principled bases to cabin antitrust decision making. The beneficiaries of a regime susceptible to capture are likely to be the powerful, not the powerless. Ironically, therefore, adding equality and dispersion of economic and political power to the objectives of the antitrust laws could prove detrimental to those very objectives.

The third and perhaps most important cost is rooted in the general application and decentralized enforcement of antitrust law. 87 Antitrust law applies to almost all businesses, and it can be enforced by at least 52 government entities and any entity that has been harmed by an antitrust violation. Antitrust law thus has a widespread effect on business conduct throughout the economy. Its principal value is found, not in the big litigated cases, but in the multitude of anticompetitive actions that do not occur because they are deterred by the antitrust laws, and in the multitude of efficiency-enhancing actions that are not deterred by an overbroad or ambiguous antitrust law.

If antitrust law is perceived as being arbitrary, it will provide a far less certain guide to business conduct. The effect might be disregard of antitrust law in circumstances in which it seems unpredictable. More likely, the effect will be excessive caution by businesses uncertain about the consequences of aggressive or novel forms of competition. The effectiveness of antitrust law in promoting competition and economic welfare will be seriously impaired.

## ADV 2

### 1NC

#### Food insecurity doesn’t cause war.

Vestby et al 18, \*Jonas, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, \*\*Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO, and \*\*\*Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); and Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography. (5/18/18, “Does hunger cause conflict?”, *Climate & Conflict Blog*, <https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/>)

It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.

Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.

#### Thumpers:

#### 1. COVID thumps food security.

Rudolfsen 20, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO. (Ida, 7/27/20, "COVID-19, Food Access, and Social Upheaval", *Climate & Conflict*, https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2020/07/covid-19-food-access-and-social-upheaval/)

According to the World Food Program’s (WFP) latest report, the COVID-19 pandemic will lead to an 82 percent increase in global food insecurity, affecting around 270 million people by the end of the year. On June 29, the organization announced it is undertaking its largest humanitarian effort to assist an increasing number of food-insecure low- and middle-income countries. In a statement about the plan, WFP Executive Director David Beasley said that “until the day we have a medical vaccine, food is the best vaccine against chaos. Without it, we could see increased social unrest and protests, a rise in migration, deepening conflict, and widespread under-nutrition among populations that were previously immune from hunger.”

Why is the pandemic leading to more food insecurity? And why is David Beasley talking about social unrest and protest in connection with food?

As COVID-19 spreads around the world, fears are mounting of how the pandemic might impact and disrupt food distribution channels (e.g., transport disruptions) and disruption in the production of staple foods (e.g., labor shortages due to quarantine measures).

So far, food supply chains have been defined as essential by governments, exempting them from most lockdown measures. Thus, the impact on supply chains has been indirect, mainly caused by reduced income and remittances. A loss of income makes it harder for poor people to access affordable food but also impacts food systems by making it more difficult for producers to sell foodstuffs, since consumer’s ability to buy food declines. Governments, especially in low- and middle-income countries, will therefore have to implement policies that avoid supply chain disruptions and higher food prices.

But what do food insecurity and food prices have to do with protest and violence? The answer: it’s complicated.

The pandemic is spreading at a time when the number of severely food insecure people in the world had already increased—by more than 820 million people before the pandemic started—adding stress to areas already hardly hit by extreme weather events, armed conflict, and low economic development. However, most of these areas have not seen widespread unrest.

#### 2. Shipping.

BMPA 20, British Meat Processors Association, (May 13, 2020, Spiraling freight costs threaten global food prices, <https://britishmeatindustry.org/industry-news/spiraling-freight-costs-threaten-global-food-prices/>

Evidence of a doubling and in some cases nearly tripling of maritime freight costs over the last month from exporters across the food supply chain has raised a red flag for food prices. The British Meat Processors Association, along with other food industry bodies, have been receiving alarming reports showing costs of a refrigerated shipping container to China, in the worst cases, rocketing almost 200% from £1200 to £3500, often with a new £500 ‘fuel surcharge’ included. We’ve also heard of new $1000+ ‘congestion taxes’ now being levied at ports in China and the Philippines. While some increase may be understandable due to difficulty filling ships for return journeys, the current price hikes which have persisted from early March are starting to look like opportunistic exploitation by a small group of large global companies which control that market. As early as mid March, reports were coming in that the congestion in Chinese ports had eased, with terminal operations returning to more normal working conditions. Indeed Shanghai, the world’s largest container port by volume had expanded its capacity for handling and storage of refrigerated containers by 40%. Back in early March, Frank Madsen from Danish freight forwarder Blue Water Shipping was quoted as saying: ‘There’s both a space and equipment issue that we think could continue for four to eight weeks’, however, the return to more normal volumes of activity in China hasn’t yet been reflected in the spot freight cost. Instead, shipping companies are somehow managing to maintain prices at hugely inflated levels. While one might think this is just affecting big businesses, the reality is that these price hikes will end up being passed on to consumers who can least afford it, both here in the UK and in poorer countries like the Philippines.

#### 3. Russian invasion.

Swanson 2/24

Anna Swanson (Ana Swanson writes about trade and international economics for the New York Times. She previously covered the economy, trade and the Federal Reserve for The Washington Post. Before that, Ana was an editor of Foreign Policy’s South Asia Channel and the editor-in-chief of China Economic Review magazine in Shanghai), “Ukraine Invasion Threatens Global Wheat Supply,” *New York Times,* 2/24/22. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/business/ukraine-russia-wheat-prices.html

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is threatening to cut off some international shipments of wheat, spurring shortages and pushing the price of a vital crop higher when supply chain disruptions have already sent food costs spiraling.

Wheat futures on the Chicago Board of Trade rose 5.43 percent on Thursday, outstripping gains by other commodities like corn and soybean oil.

Russia and Ukraine together produce nearly a quarter of the world’s wheat, feeding billions of people in the form of bread, pasta and packaged foods. The countries are also key suppliers of barley, sunflower seed oil and corn, among other products.

In recent days, the price of agricultural commodities has fluctuated sharply as tensions around the Black Sea threaten to disrupt global shipments of wheat, corn and vegetable oil. Disruptions and rising prices for those commodities — as well as the cost of fuel and fertilizer, important inputs for farmers — could further buffet global food markets and threaten social stability, analysts said.

Food prices have already risen globally as a result of pandemic-related shipping disruptions, rising costs for farmers and adverse weather, and wheat is no exception. Between April 2020 and December 2021, the price of wheat increased 80 percent, according to data from the International Monetary Fund. That was on a par with rising costs for corn and higher than increases for soybeans or coffee.

David Laborde, a senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute, said the crisis would “likely have an immediate impact on the global wheat market stability.” But the real test for the global food supply would be in four months, he said, when the next wheat harvest would begin.

“By then, if farmers could not harvest due to lasting military operations, or if port facilities and railroads have been damaged, the situation will be particularly gloomy,” he said. “Many countries in North Africa and the Middle East are particularly dependent on wheat from Ukraine and Russia and likely to be hard hit.”

#### US supply isn’t key to global ag.

Charles 13, NPR’s food and agriculture correspondent. Citing Margaret Mellon, a scientist with the environmental advocacy group Union of Concerned Scientists. (Dan, 9/17/13, “American Farmers Say They Feed The World, But Do They?”, *NPR*, https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2013/09/17/221376803/american-farmers-say-they-feed-the-world-but-do-they)

And this is why the words “feed the world” grate on the nerves of people who believe that large-scale, technology-driven agriculture is bad for the environment and often bad for people. Margaret Mellon, a scientist with the environmental advocacy group Union of Concerned Scientists, recently wrote an essay in which she confessed to developing an allergy to that phrase. “If there’s a controversy, the show-stopper is supposed to be, ‘We have to use pesticides, or we won’t be able to feed the world!’ “ she says. Mellon says it’s time to set that idea aside. It doesn’t answer the concerns that people have about modern agriculture — and it’s not even true. American-style farming doesn’t really grow food for hungry people, she says. Forty percent of the biggest crop — corn — goes into fuel for cars. Most of the second-biggest crop — soybeans — is fed to animals. Growing more grain isn’t the solution to hunger anyway, she says. If you’re really trying to solve that problem, there’s a long list of other steps that are much more important. “We need to empower women; we need to raise incomes; we need infrastructure in the developing world; we need the ability to get food to market without spoiling.”

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#### 3---wars of accumulation---they trigger great-power conflict and turn the case

Burden-Stelly 20, Assistant Professor of Africana Studies and Political Science @ Carleton. (Charisse, 7-1-2020, "Modern U.S. Racial Capitalism: Some Theoretical Insights", *Monthly Review*, <https://monthlyreview.org/2020/07/01/modern-u-s-racial-capitalism/>)

In what remains of this essay, I will draw on the work of Black Marxist-Leninists and anticapitalists to explicate the defining features of modern U.S. racial capitalism—war and militarism, imperialist accumulation, expropriation by domination, labor superexploitation, and property by dispossession. In this, I demonstrate that their critiques and analyses offer a blueprint for theorizing modern U.S. racial capitalism.

War and militarism facilitate the endless drive for profit. Military conflicts between imperial powers result in the reapportioning of boundaries, possessions, and spheres of influence that often exacerbate racial and spatial economic subjection. War and militarism also perpetuate the endless construction of “threats,” primarily in racialized and socialist states, against which to defend progress, prosperity, freedom, and security. The manufacturing of conflict legitimates the mobilization of extraordinary violence to expropriate untold resources that produce relations of underdevelopment, dependency, extraversion, and disarticulation in the Global South. Moreover, the ruling elite and labor aristocracy in imperialist countries, not least the United States, wage perpetual war to defend their way of life and standard of living against the racialized majority who, because they would benefit most from the redistribution of the world’s wealth and resources, represent a perpetual threat.

Here, Du Bois’s 1915 essay, “The African Roots of War,” is instructive.34 Though he does not directly analyze the United States, he nonetheless demonstrates how racism, white supremacy, and the plunder of Africa underpinned the capitalist imperialist war that engulfed the world from July 1914 to November 1918—a war that catapulted the United States into the center of the capitalist world system. Using Du Bois’s own words, Hubert Harrison, the father of Harlem radicalism, makes the direct link:

But since every industrial nation is seeking the same outlet for its products, clashes are inevitable and in these clashes beaks and claws—armies and navies—must come into play. Hence beaks and claws must be provided beforehand against the day of conflict, and hence the exploitation of white men in Europe and America becomes the reason for the exploitation of black and brown and yellow men in African and Asia. And, therefore, it is hypocritical and absurd to pretend that the capitalist nations can ever intend to abolish wars.… For white folk to insist upon the right to manage their own ancestral lands, free from the domination of tyrants, domestic and foreign, is variously described as “democracy” and “self-determination.” For Negroes, Egyptians and Hindus to seek the same thing is impudence.… Truly has it been said that “the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the ‘Color Line.'” And wars are not likely to end; in fact, they are likely to be wider and more terrible—so long as this theory of white domination seeks to hold down the majority of the world’s people under the iron heel of racial oppression.35

#### 2---rationalism---the 1AC in anchored in a calculative economic model that’s prefigured to naturalize conquest and racial exploitation.

Hardin & Towns 19, \*Carolyn, Assistant Professor of Media and Communication & American Studies @ Miami University. \*\*Armond R., Department of Communication Studies @ The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. (December 2019, “Plastic Empowerment: Financial Literacy and Black Economic Life”, *American Quarterly*, Volume 71, Number 4, pg. 978-980)

Homo Economicus’s Others: Black Objects and Black Debt

One of the financial literacy programs run by the government, Money Smart, is a free “instructor-led curriculum” that can be taught in “a classroom or small group setting.”56 The curriculum covers “deposit and credit services offered by financial institutions, choosing and maintaining a checking account, spending plans, the importance of saving, how to obtain and use credit effectively, and the basics of building or repairing credit.”57 These materials, among many others, display the basic and well-established assumptions of financial literacy education: that individual financial stability requires rational calculations and decision-making. In other words, financial literacy is a normative project to bring individuals into compliance with the simplistic assumptions of economic models, or what James Kwak terms “economism.”58 As such, financial literacy acknowledges and seeks to remediate what behavioral economists have long noted: that models do not match reality because individuals do not act rationally.59 However, if individuals can be made to act rationally, optimal economic outcomes can be achieved. In other words, the purpose of financial literacy is to make each of us a well-functioning and rational “homo economicus,” the idealized subject of free market capitalism.

Financial literacy is just the latest narrative to deploy a version of homo economicus as the baseline subject of economic rationality. Although the term is said to have originated only in the nineteenth century in response to the writing of John Stuart Mill, the notion of a “proper” capitalist subject who acts correctly within various models of capitalism is much older.60 It is also a raced subject. The history of capitalism reveals that the dominant notion of economic rationality is constructed as/in a white subject over and against black bodies both as objects rather than subjects of capitalism and as intense targets of exploitative debt. This racial tension at the heart of economic rationality reveals the racial stakes of calls for financial literacy education of black consumers.

White Subject, Black Object

According to Michel Foucault, the homo economicus of the late twentieth century eschews the early political economic concern of buying and selling one’s own labor power—with all its potentially collectivist political implications—for the individualized pursuit of self-interest “as an entrepreneur of himself.”61 Foucault offers as evidence Gary Becker’s universalizing idea of “human capital.” Homo economicus is he who can solve any social problem by accumulating human capital that produces an earnings stream for the entrepreneur of himself. But this entrepreneurial self-determination is not equally accessible by all raced subjects. According to Denise Ferreira da Silva, the black is not self-determined but “outer-determined,” which is to say, always open to being “affected,” manipulated by the Western subject for his own benefit.62 The black, then, functions as one about whom choices are made, not one who makes choices.

Sylvia Wynter provides the most explicit argument of the overrepresentation of homo economicus as white within the Western construct of the human, which she argues cannot be disarticulated from capitalism. Indeed, homo economicus emerges out of the shift from the Renaissance’s conceptions of politics and Western Judeo-Christianity as signifiers of the human, what she calls “Man1,” to “Man2,” or “a figure based on the Western bourgeoisie’s model of being human that has been articulated as, since the latter half of the nineteenth century, liberal monohumanism’s homo oeconomicus.”63 Likewise, Lisa Tilley argues that Wynter’s homo economicus is a revision of a racialized humanness, “formulated within the colonial episteme’s Darwinian distortions as divided between the naturally selected (Europeans) and the naturally ‘dysselected’ (those racialized as naturally inferiority).”64 Wynter finds the origins of this shift in humanness in the “colonial matrix of power.”65 In her essay “1492,” she argues that Christopher Columbus functioned as a racialized turning point for Europe, one that replaced Western religious conceptions of knowledge, such as the world being flat, with secularized conceptions of the world.66 Further, Columbus’s voyage had as much to do with spreading Chris- tianity and glorifying the Spanish nation as it did with enriching “himself and his family with all the gold and tribute he could extort from the indigenous peoples, even from making some into cabezas de indios y indias (heads of Indian men and women), who could be sold as slaves.”67

Wynter notes that Columbus is often positioned in terms of celebratory American “discovery” in ways that brush over the colonial, nationalistic, and imperialistic implications of his individual financial aspirations and the objectification of black bodies on which those aspirations depended. Walter Mignolo follows Wynter, providing some insight into the racial foundations of homo economicus, particularly connecting it to Western colonialism and imperialism, both of which are inseparable from the post-Columbian context.68 Mignolo argues that the self-interested optimization that fleshes out the figure of homo economicus assumes coloniality and imperialism.69 In effect, Western colonial enrichment—at the expense of indigenous racial others of Europe—is already inherent in the “economic rationality” of homo economicus, as it is seen as a financially rational tool of enrichment, rather than a moral wrong.

Elsewhere Wynter claims that the proto-notion of homo economicus that circulated in the sixteenth century underwent important transformations by the nineteenth century. Further removed from Judeo-Christianity, conceptions of economic rationality in the nineteenth century functioned in raced form to articulate both black and indigenous populations in the “New World” as the epitome of economic irrationality. Wynter notes that by the nineteenth century, the black slave “would now be made into the physical referent of the ostensibly most racially inferior and non-evolved Other to Man, itself redefined as optimally homo economicus.”70 The black slave is in effect the defining opposite of homo economicus, that nonbeing who is less than human and/ or not human at all. Where homo economicus is self-interested and free to choose—the subject who can fulfill the ultimate human goal of surplus accumulation on his own—the slave is utterly removed from not only this goal but even the possibility of choosing or acting within the construct of the self.

#### a---profit---1AC’s focus on agricultural market exchange positions food as a commodity---that’s the research paradigm that fuels big ag.

Gerardo Patron-Cano 15. Graduate Studies @ University of Denver. MODERN CAPITALISM AND FOOD COMMODITIZATION: THE LIMITATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE AND THE CHALLENGES OF SUSTAINABLE ALTERNATIVES. Faculty of Social Sciences. June 2015. Pg.1-3

The UN predicts that around two billion more people will populate the world by 2050, half of who will be born in sub-Saharan Africa and 30 percent in Southeast and South Asia (United Nations, 2013). Malnutrition remains common in these areas even though global food production is abundant; this is mainly because food is considered a commodity to be traded on liberalized markets (Magdoff, 2012). The capitalist process has spurred farmers to produce for the sole purpose of profit accumulation, instead of production for use (Foster, 2002). In other words, food has been commoditized to a money metric like any other commodity that is traded and sold for profit. Instead of growing food for consumption, commodity crops are cultivated to be sold in international markets (de Janvry & LeVeen, 1986). Food was commoditized with the liberalization of trade markets after the Second World War. Since then, the commodity nature of the prevailing agricultural system contributes to the poor being dependent on market fluctuations for food. Poverty and malnutrition in the US is also borne out of the capitalist principles that have commoditized food systems worldwide. Even though food is plenty in the US, the poor do not have the financial means to demand food; in fact, about 50 million people in the US are considered “food insecure” while 40 percent of the food in the US goes uneaten (Magdoff, 2012, Gunders, 2012). Since food is a commodity sold for profit accumulation, the poor in the US must skip meals, rely on food stamps, buy food of lower nutritional value, or receive food assistance from charities (Magdoff, 2012). The expansion of capitalism has induced farmers to specialize and export their farms’ yields. The cultivation of commodity crops typically depends upon industrialized growing methods, which involve the application of chemical inputs that pollute the land, water, and air. US food and farm policies have financially supported the capitalist expansion of industrial agriculture.1 Proponents of industrial agriculture call attention to the improvements in food production that allowed US farmers in 2000 to produce an average 12 times more farm yield per hour than US farmers did in 1950 (Fuglie, MacDonald, & Ball, 2007). While industrialized processes proved successful in producing unprecedented yields, conventional agribusiness growing practices became dependent on environmentally harmful chemical inputs (Leo, Lawrence, & Walker, 2002). Post-WWII, farms replaced natural ecosystem services with chemical inputs to maintain pests, diseases, and weeds (Ikerd, 1993). Today, agribusinesses do not utilize local ecosystem services to produce crops because producing biologically is not profitable; indeed, industrial agriculture’s main purpose is to produce profits, not sustainably grown food. As such, it relies on the application of chemical inputs such as artificial fertilizers, pesticides, or herbicides in order to successfully produce its monocultures. Before the commoditization of food, most farmers selected the plant varieties most compatible with the farm’s local conditions; diversified crop production to hedge against any failures; managed the soil and protected its quality; did not rely on intensive inputs; and finally, considered the production-consumption cycle’s externalities (Feenstra, 2014).

#### 2---redirection---the plan causes agribusiness to reconsolidate internationally---zeroes solvency and dumps big ag’s harms onto the Global South

Rob Wallace et. al. 20.  Evolutionary epidemiologist who has consulted with the Food and Agriculture Organization and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Alex Liebman is a PhD student in human geography at Rutgers University, with a MSc in agronomy from the University of Minnesota. Luis Fernando Chaves is a disease ecologist and was a Senior Researcher at the Costa Rican Institute for Research and Education on Nutrition and Health in Tres Rios, Costa Rica. Rodrick Wallace is a research scientist in the Division of Epidemiology of the New York State Psychiatric Institute at Columbia University. COVID-19 and the Circuits of Capital. Monthly Review. 03-27-2020. https://monthlyreview.org/2020/05/01/covid-19-and-circuits-of-capital/

Outbreak zones meanwhile are no longer even organized under traditional polities. Unequal ecological exchange—redirecting the worst damage from industrial agriculture to the Global South—has moved out of solely stripping localities of resources by state-led imperialism and into new complexes across scale and commodity.32 Agribusiness is reconfiguring their extractivist operations into spatially discontinuous networks across territories of differing scales.33 A series of multinational-based “Soybean Republics,” for instance, now range across Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil. The new geography is embodied by changes in company management structure, capitalization, subcontracting, supply chain substitutions, leasing, and transnational land pooling.34 In straddling national borders, these “commodity countries,” flexibly embedded across ecologies and political borders, are producing new epidemiologies along the way.35

For instance, despite a general shift in population from commoditized rural areas to urban slums that continues today across the globe, the rural-urban divide driving much of the discussion around disease emergence misses rural-destined labor and the rapid growth of rural towns into periurban desakotas (city villages) or zwischenstadt (in-between cities). Mike Davis and others have identified how these newly urbanizing landscapes act as both local markets and regional hubs for global agricultural commodities passing through. 36 Some such regions have even gone “post-agricultural.”37 As a result, forest disease dynamics, the pathogens’ primeval sources, are no longer constrained to the hinterlands alone. Their associated epidemiologies have themselves turned relational, felt across time and space. A SARS can suddenly find itself spilling over into humans in the big city only a few days out of its bat cave.

Ecosystems in which such “wild” viruses were in part controlled by the complexities of the tropical forest are being drastically streamlined by capital-led deforestation and, at the other end of periurban development, by deficits in public health and environmental sanitation.38 While many sylvatic pathogens are dying off with their host species as a result, a subset of infections that once burned out relatively quickly in the forest, if only by an irregular rate of encountering their typical host species, are now propagating across susceptible human populations whose vulnerability to infection is often exacerbated in cities by austerity programs and corrupted regulation. Even in the face of efficacious vaccines, the resulting outbreaks are characterized by greater extent, duration, and momentum. What were once local spillovers are now epidemics trawling their way through global webs of travel and trade.39

By this parallax effect—by a change in the environmental background alone—old standards such as Ebola, Zika, malaria, and yellow fever, evolving comparatively little, have all made sharp turns into regional threats.40 They have suddenly moved from spilling over into remote villagers now and again to infecting thousands in capital cities. In something of the other ecological direction, even wild animals, routinely longtime disease reservoirs, are suffering blowback. Their populations fragmented by deforestation, native New World monkeys susceptible to wildtype yellow fever, to which they had been exposed for at least a hundred years, are losing their herd immunity and dying in the hundreds of thousands.41

Expansion

If by its global expansion alone, commodity agriculture serves as both propulsion for and nexus through which pathogens of diverse origins migrate from the most remote reservoirs to the most international of population centers.42 It is here, and along the way, where novel pathogens infiltrate agriculture’s gated communities. The lengthier the associated supply chains and the greater the extent of adjunct deforestation, the more diverse (and exotic) the zoonotic pathogens that enter the food chain. Among recent emergent and reemergent farm and foodborne pathogens, originating from across the anthropogenic domain, are African swine fever, Campylobacter, Cryptosporidium, Cyclospora, Ebola Reston, E. coli O157:H7, foot-and-mouth disease, hepatitis E, Listeria, Nipah virus, Q fever, Salmonella, Vibrio, Yersinia, and a variety of novel influenza variants, including H1N1 (2009), H1N2v, H3N2v, H5N1, H5N2, H5Nx, H6N1, H7N1, H7N3, H7N7, H7N9, and H9N2.43

#### Profit incentive is the root cause. Alt solves, aff doesn’t.

Matt Huber 20. Assistant professor of geography at Syracuse University. “COVID-19 Shows Why We Must Socialize the Food System”. https://jacobinmag.com/2020/04/covid-food-system-coronavirus-agriculture-farming

The COVID-19 crisis is revealing a basic contradiction at the heart of capitalism. On the one hand, we have learned that this virus is itself a product of our capitalist agricultural system. As Rob Wallace and coauthors argue, the conditions for virus transmission are rooted in our propensity to clear-cut dense, wild forests — often the reservoirs of viruses themselves — and replace them with homogenous plantation ecologies like palm oil or livestock operations with one species of animal crowded together.

As they put it:

the entirety of the production line is organized around practices that accelerate the evolution of pathogen virulence and subsequent transmission. Growing genetic monocultures — food animals and plants with nearly identical genomes — removes immune firebreaks that in more diverse populations slow down transmission.

For example, the avian and swine influenza outbreaks of years past often have their origins in confined livestock feeding operations. COVID-19 apparently emerged in a “wet market” that combined all kinds of natural commodities, from exotic wild animals like snakes to domesticated livestock like hogs. Congregating multiple kinds of species in a small space with loads of human buyers and sellers is an excellent platform for virus transmission.

As one scholar put it, “We cut the trees; we kill the animals or cage them and send them to markets. We disrupt ecosystems, and we shake viruses loose from their natural hosts. When that happens, they need a new host. Often, we are it.”

On the other hand, for millions of workers across the world, a brutal ecological reality of capitalism asserts itself: we depend on money to access those same very agricultural supply chains to live. Millions of workers living paycheck to paycheck see their jobs or wages cut, forcing families to decide how much they can spend on rent versus food.

For those working-class people still with income, the experience of the epidemic has been one of nervously pacing through crowded grocery aisles, fighting with others over toilet paper, and discovering shelf after emptied shelf. Grocery supply chain experts declare that “there is plenty of food in the country,” but it is clear that “just-in-time” supply-chain capitalism is ill equipped to service all of society’s needs in a global pandemic.

The supply chains use statistical algorithms to predict consumer demand so it can be fine-tuned with production and logistics networks. These systems are geared toward saving retail corporations money on inventory (warehousing) costs, but they easily fail when demand unexpectedly spikes or “disruptions” occur in the supply chain.

And now the violence of the market is asserting itself through price spikes for basic food staples. Communities are going hungry as local food banks run short of the basics, while farmers are leaving fresh vegetables to rot in the fields and dairy producers are dumping milk down the drain because of plummeting prices and lack of demand. So much for the nimble and resilient market, supposedly the most efficient system in allocating resources.

The capitalist agri-food system is clearly irrational. The socialist demand that can move us toward a food system based on social and ecological needs should ring a familiar bell: food for all.

If the “Medicare for All” struggle has shown the popularity of the slogan “health care is a human right,” then why is food not seen the same way? The only thing preventing “food as a human right” is an industry that relies on creating artificial scarcity of food to maintain prices and profits.

A socialist approach to these problems can’t address them piecemeal, reforming agriculture on the one hand and delivering food as a human right on the other. The goal should be to revolutionize the entire food system and orient it toward social and ecological needs.

COVID-19 and the Capitalist Food System

As we discover our agricultural system is responsible for spreading the virus, we also realize how perilously dependent we all are on those very systems of food provision for survival. Both of these problems are caused by one problem: our food system as a whole is controlled by private, for-profit capitalists.

As Wallace et al. explain, the agricultural system is structured in a narrow way: “the private command of production remains entirely focused on profit.” It is the profit motive and competition that compels agricultural producers to brutally rationalize and homogenize nature in the form of the monoculture plantation or mono-species livestock operation. These not only provide perfect ecological systems for virus transmission, they also replace formerly biodiverse ecologies that tend to keep wild viruses at bay.

Yet we can’t think of these agro-industrial farms in isolation from the larger system. All these capitalist agro-industrial profits would be impossible if it were not for its main source of consumer demand: working classes all around the world dispossessed of any means of livelihood, who can only eat so long as they work for money.

As Raj Patel argued over a decade ago, we live in an “hourglass” food system where, on both ends, millions of farmers and worker-consumers are exploited by a tiny group of agro-industrial corporations in the middle, the food processors and retail giants. Working-class demand is essential to the entire system. Even the best kind of government-welfare provisions, like food stamps or the current interest in a Universal Basic Income (UBI), only ensure further cash flowing into the hands of the massive retail chains, food processors, and agribusiness companies.

#### Cap can’t solve the environment:

#### 1---climate apartheid---capitalist “solutions” to warming will leave the Global South to die.

HRC 19, United Nations Human Rights Council (“Climate change and poverty,” *Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights*, <https://srpovertyorg.files.wordpress.com/2019/06/unsr-poverty-climate-change-a_hrc_41_39.pdf>)

50. Rather than helping the world adapt to climate change, privatizing basic services and social protection may be a form of maladaptation. When hurricane Sandy wreaked havoc in New York in 2012, stranding low-income and vulnerable New Yorkers without access to power and healthcare, the Goldman Sachs headquarters was protected by tens of thousands of its own sandbags and power from its generator.114 Private white-glove firefighters have been dispatched to save the mansions of high-end insurance customers from wildfires.115 ``An over-reliance on the private sector could lead to a climate apartheid scenario in which the wealthy pay to escape overheating, hunger, and conflict, while the rest of the world is left to suffer.

#### 2---innovation fails---it’s NOT disruptive.

Parrique et al. 19, \*Timothée Parrique, Centre for Studies and Research in International Development (CERDI), University of \*Clermont Auvergne, France; Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC), Stockholm University, Sweden \*Jonathan Barth, ZOE.Institute for Future-Fit Economies, Bonn, Germany \*François Briens, Independent, Informal Research Centre for Human Emancipation (IRCHE) \*Christian Kerschner, Department of Sustainability, Governance, and Methods, MODUL University Vienna, Austria; Department of Environmental Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic \*Alejo Kraus-Polk, University of California, Davis, USA \*Anna Kuokkanen, Lappeenranta-Lahti University of Technology, Lahti, Finland \*Joachim H. Spangenberg, Sustainable Europe Research Institute (SERI Germany), Cologne, Germany; (July 2019, “Decoupling Debunked: Evidence and arguments against green growth as a sole strategy for sustainability”, Accessible at: <https://eeb.org/library/decoupling-debunked/>, pg. 4-5) \*Bullet points removed.

The validity of the green growth discourse relies on the assumption of an absolute, permanent, global, large and fast enough decoupling of economic growth from all critical environmental pressures. The literature reviewed clearly shows that there is no empirical evidence for such a decoupling currently happening. This is the case for materials, energy, water, greenhouse gases, land, water pollutants, and biodiversity loss for which decoupling is either only relative, and/or observed only temporarily, and/or only locally. In most cases, decoupling is relative. When absolute decoupling occurs, it is observed only during rather short periods of time, concerning only certain resources or forms of impact, for specific locations, and with very small rates of mitigation. There are at least seven reasons to be sceptical about the occurrence of sufficient decoupling in the future. Each of them taken individually casts doubt on the possibility for sufficient decoupling and, thus, the feasibility of “green growth.” Considered all together, the hypothesis that decoupling will allow economic growth to continue without a rise in environmental pressures appears highly compromised, if not clearly unrealistic. 1 Rising energy expenditures. When extracting a resource, cheaper options are generally used first, the extraction of remaining stocks then becoming a more resource- and energy-intensive process resulting in an increase in total environmental degradation per unit of resource extracted. 2 Rebound effects. Efficiency improvements are often partly or totally compensated by a reallocation of saved resources and money to either more of the same consumption (e.g. using a fuel-efficient car more often), or other impactful consumptions (e.g. buying plane tickets for remote holidays with the money saved from fuel economies). It can also generate structural changes in the economy that induce higher consumption (e.g. more fuel-efficient cars reinforce a car-based transport system at the expense of greener alternatives, such as public transport and cycling). 3 Problem shifting. Technological solutions to one environmental problem can create new ones and/or exacerbate others. For example, the production of private electric vehicles puts pressure on lithium, copper, and cobalt resources; the production of biofuel raises concerns about land use; while nuclear power generation produces nuclear risks and logistic concerns regarding nuclear waste disposal. 4 The underestimated impact of services. The service economy can only exist on top of the material economy, not instead of it. Services have a significant footprint that often adds to, rather than substitute, that of goods. 5 Limited potential of recycling. Recycling rates are currently low and only slowly increasing, and recycling processes generally still require a significant amount of energy and virgin raw materials. Most importantly, recycling is strictly limited in its ability to provide resources for an expanding material economy. 6 Insufficient and inappropriate technological change. Technological progress is not targeting the factors of production that matter for ecological sustainability and not leading to the type of innovations that reduce environmental pressures; it is not disruptive enough as it fails to displace other undesirable technologies; and it is not in itself fast enough to enable a sufficient decoupling. 7 Cost shifting. What has been observed and termed as decoupling in some local cases was generally only apparent decoupling resulting mostly from an externalisation of environmental impact from high-consumption to low-consumption countries enabled by international trade. Accounting on a footprint basis reveals a much less optimistic picture and casts further doubt on the possibility of a consistent decoupling in the future.

#### 3---aggregate data goes neg.

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6. Green growth is not a thing

Milanovic believes that technology will come to our rescue, and make growth “green”. Unfortunately there is a strong consensus against this assumption. We have reviewed the relevant empirical evidence here (“Is green growth possible?”), examining both CO2 emissions and resource use.

Briefly, about CO2, the question is not whether GDP can be decoupled from emissions (we know that it can be), the question is whether this can be done fast enough to stay within safe carbon budgets while growing GDP at the same time. And the answer to this is no. More growth entails more energy use, and more energy use makes it all the more difficult to cover that demand with renewables. The only scenarios that succeed in reducing emissions fast enough to keep us under 1.5 or 2C involve a reduction in resource and energy use (in other words, degrowth). I discuss this in more depth here. This 2020 review examines 835 empirical studies and finds that decoupling alone is not adequate to achieve climate goals; it requires what the authors themselves refer to as “degrowth” scenarios. This paper in Nature Sustainability comes to similar conclusions.

As for resources: resource use continues to rise along with GDP (despite significant efficiency improvements, and a significant shift to services and knowledge as share of GDP), and indeed all existing models indicate that absolute decoupling is unlikely to happen, even under strong policy conditions. See here and here for more.

Ward et al (2016) find that even the most optimistic projections of efficiency improvements yield no absolute decoupling in the medium and long term. The authors state: “this result is a robust rebuttal to the claim of absolute decoupling”; “decoupling of GDP growth from resource use, whether relative or absolute, is at best only temporary. Permanent decoupling (absolute or relative) is impossible… because the efficiency gains are ultimately governed by physical limits.” Schandl et al (2016) find the same thing. Even in their best-case scenario projection, global material consumption still grows steadily. The authors conclude: “Our research shows that while some relative decoupling can be achieved in some scenarios, none would lead to an absolute reduction in energy or materials footprint.”

Our review was published in 2019, and the literature on this has grown since: i.e., here and here… the latter paper reviews 179 studies on decoupling published since 1990 and finds “no evidence of economy-wide, national or international absolute resource decoupling, and no evidence of the kind of decoupling needed for ecological sustainability.” Here is a 2020 meta-analysis of all available data on GDP and resource use, which comes to the same conclusion.

#### 4---renewables under cap wreak havoc on ecosystems and renew colonialism.

Hickel 19, PhD, Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, Senior Lecturer at Goldsmiths, University of London. (Jason, 5-6-2019, "The Limits of Clean Energy", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/06/the-path-to-clean-energy-will-be-very-dirty-climate-change-renewables/)

We need a rapid transition to renewables, yes—but scientists warn that we can’t keep growing energy use at existing rates. No energy is innocent. The only truly clean energy is less energy.In 2017, the World Bank released a little-noticed report that offered the first comprehensive look at this question. It models the increase in material extraction that would be required to build enough solar and wind utilities to produce an annual output of about 7 terawatts of electricity by 2050. That’s enough to power roughly half of the global economy. By doubling the World Bank figures, we can estimate what it will take to get all the way to zero emissions—and the results are staggering: 34 million metric tons of copper, 40 million tons of lead, 50 million tons of zinc, 162 million tons of aluminum, and no less than 4.8 billion tons of iron. In some cases, the transition to renewables will require a massive increase over existing levels of extraction. For neodymium—an essential element in wind turbines—extraction will need to rise by nearly 35 percent over current levels. Higher-end estimates reported by the World Bank suggest it could double. The same is true of silver, which is critical to solar panels. Silver extraction will go up 38 percent and perhaps as much as 105 percent. Demand for indium, also essential to solar technology, will more than triple and could end up skyrocketing by 920 percent. And then there are all the batteries we’re going to need for power storage. To keep energy flowing when the sun isn’t shining and the wind isn’t blowing will require enormous batteries at the grid level. This means 40 million tons of lithium—an eye-watering 2,700 percent increase over current levels of extraction. That’s just for electricity. We also need to think about vehicles. This year, a group of leading British scientists submitted a letter to the U.K. Committee on Climate Change outlining their concerns about the ecological impact of electric cars. They agree, of course, that we need to end the sale and use of combustion engines. But they pointed out that unless consumption habits change, replacing the world’s projected fleet of 2 billion vehicles is going to require an explosive increase in mining: Global annual extraction of neodymium and dysprosium will go up by another 70 percent, annual extraction of copper will need to more than double, and cobalt will need to increase by a factor of almost four—all for the entire period from now to 2050. The problem here is not that we’re going to run out of key minerals—although that may indeed become a concern. The real issue is that this will exacerbate an already existing crisis of overextraction. Mining has become one of the biggest single drivers of deforestation, ecosystem collapse, and biodiversity loss around the world. Ecologists estimate that even at present rates of global material use, we are overshooting sustainable levels by 82 percent. Take silver, for instance. Mexico is home to the Peñasquito mine, one of the biggest silver mines in the world. Covering nearly 40 square miles, the operation is staggering in its scale: a sprawling open-pit complex ripped into the mountains, flanked by two waste dumps each a mile long, and a tailings dam full of toxic sludge held back by a wall that’s 7 miles around and as high as a 50-story skyscraper. This mine will produce 11,000 tons of silver in 10 years before its reserves, the biggest in the world, are gone. To transition the global economy to renewables, we need to commission up to 130 more mines on the scale of Peñasquito. Just for silver. Lithium is another ecological disaster. It takes 500,000 gallons of water to produce a single ton of lithium. Even at present levels of extraction this is causing problems. In the Andes, where most of the world’s lithium is located, mining companies are burning through the water tables and leaving farmers with nothing to irrigate their crops. Many have had no choice but to abandon their land altogether. Meanwhile, chemical leaks from lithium mines have poisoned rivers from Chile to Argentina, Nevada to Tibet, killing off whole freshwater ecosystems. The lithium boom has barely even started, and it’s already a crisis. And all of this is just to power the existing global economy. Things become even more extreme when we start accounting for growth. As energy demand continues to rise, material extraction for renewables will become all the more aggressive—and the higher the growth rate, the worse it will get. It’s important to keep in mind that most of the key materials for the energy transition are located in the global south. Parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia will likely become the target of a new scramble for resources, and some countries may become victims of new forms of colonization. It happened in the 17th and 18th centuries with the hunt for gold and silver from South America. In the 19th century, it was land for cotton and sugar plantations in the Caribbean. In the 20th century, it was diamonds from South Africa, cobalt from Congo, and oil from the Middle East. It’s not difficult to imagine that the scramble for renewables might become similarly violent. If we don’t take precautions, clean energy firms could become as destructive as fossil fuel companies—buying off politicians, trashing ecosystems, lobbying against environmental regulations, even assassinating community leaders who stand in their way.

# 1NR

## ADV 2

#### No causal evidence, only maybe true for the poorest countries, and government responses check

Rosegrant 13, Director of the Environment and Production Technology Division at the International Food Policy Research Institute, et al. (Mark W., 2013, “The Future of the Global Food Economy: Scenarios for Supply, Demand, and Prices”, in *Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability*, pg. 39-40

The food price spikes in the late 2000s caught the world’s attention, particularly when sharp increases in food and fuel prices in 2008 coincided with street demonstrations and riots in many countries. For 2008 and the two preceding years, researchers identified a significant number of countries (totaling 54) with protests during what was called the global food crisis (Benson et al. 2008). Violent protests occurred in 21 countries, and nonviolent protests occurred in 44 countries. Both types of protest took place in 11 countries. In a separate analysis, developing countries with low government effectiveness experienced more food price protests between 2007 and 2008 than countries with high government effectiveness (World Bank 201la). Although the incidence of violent protests was much higher in countries with less capable governance, many factors could be causing or contributing to these protests, such as government response tactics, rather than the initial food price spike.

Data on food riots and food prices have tracked together in recent years. Agricultural commodity prices started strengthening in international markets in 2006. In the latter half of 2007, as prices continued to rise, two or fewer food price riots per month were recorded (based on World Food Programme data, as reported in Brinkman and Hendrix 2011). As prices peaked and remained high during mid-2008, the number of riots increased dramatically, with a cumulative total of 84 by August 2008. Subsequently, both prices and the monthly number of protests declined.

Several researchers have studied the connection between food price shocks and conflict, finding at least some relationship between food prices and conflict. According to Dell et al. (2008), higher food prices lead to income declines and an increase in political instability, but only for poor countries. Researchers also found a positive and significant relationship between weather shocks (affecting food availability, prices, and real income) and the probability of suffering government repression or a civil war (Besley and Persson 2009). Arezki and Bruckner (2011) evaluated a constructed food price index and political variables, including data on riots and anti-government demonstrations and measures of civil unrest. Using data from 61 countries over the period 1970 to 2007, they found a direct connection between food price shocks and an increased likelihood of civil conflict, including riots and demonstrations.

Other researchers have broadened the analysis by considering government responses or underlying policies that affect local prices, and consequently influence outcomes and the linkage between food price shocks and conflict. Carter and Bates (2012) evaluated data from 30 developing countries for the time period 1961 to 2001, concluding that when governments mitigate the impact of food price shocks on urban consumers, the apparent relationship between food price shocks and civil war disappears. Moreover, when the urban consumers can expect a favorable response, the protests only serve as a motivation for a policy response rather than as a prelude to something more serious, such as violent demonstrations or even civil war.

Many in the international development community see war and conflict as a development issue, with a war or conflict severely damaging the local economy, which in turn leads to forced migration and dislocation, and ultimately acute food insecurity. Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) ask if it could be the other way around, with food insecurity causing conflict. Their answer, based on a review of the literature, is “a highly qualified yes,” especially for intrastate conflict. The primary reason is that insecurity itself heightens the risk of democratic breakdown and civil conflict. The linkage connecting food insecurity to conflict is contingent on levels of economic development (a stronger linkage for poorer countries), existing political institutions, and other factors. The researchers say establishing causation directly is elusive, considering a lack of evidence for explaining individual behavior. The debate over cause and effect is ongoing.

Policies can nevertheless be implemented to reduce price variability. Less costly forms of stabilization, at least in terms of government outlays, include reducing import tariffs (and quotas) to lower prices and restricting exports to increase food availability. However, these types of policy responses, while perhaps helping an individual country’s consumers in the short run, can lead to increased international price volatility, with potential for disproportionate adverse impacts on other countries that also may be experiencing food insecurity.

#### Intervening actors.

Barrett 13, Deputy Dean and Dean of Academic Affairs of the College of Business, Stephen B. and Janice G. Ashley Professor of Applied Economics and Management, and an International Professor of Agriculture, all at the Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management, as well as a Professor in the Department of Economics and a Fellow of the David R. Atkinson Center for a Sustainable Future, all at Cornell University. (Christopher B., “Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability,” 26 September 2013, Google Books)

The simplest definition of sociopolitical stability is the absence of coordinated human activities that cause widespread disruption of daily life for local populations. Note that this excludes violent personal crimes, such as murder, and natural disasters. But this definition encompasses a continuum of activities that we can array according to the magnitude of their human consequences, from nonviolent riots or large-scale political protests and work stoppages at one end, through violent versions of such organized actions, to guerilla movements and terrorism by state and non-state actors, to outright civil war, and finally to interstate war at the other. Boulding (1978) defined peace as the absence of war and emphasized that peace does not require the resolution of all conflicts within or among nations, merely that such conflict remain nonviolent. As used here and in the rest of this volume, stability is an even more Utopian state than mere peace. For example, many of the food riots of the past several years proved extremely disruptive to the populations affected—and threatening to governments—but did not turn violent, at least in the sense of causing deaths. We consider such events moments of instability, even though peace prevailed.

This sort of hierarchical ordering is instructive, as it underscores two fundamental points made directly or indirectly by multiple contributors to this volume. First, not all instability is bad. When peaceful, structured, political, legal, and economic conflict occurs where the probability of large-scale conflict is negligible, mobilization against state policy is not automatically negative. Indeed, nonviolent social protest movements can be important forces for productive change. Social movements often push states to adopt policies that ultimately enhance both food security and sociopolitical stability by offering some redress for longstanding structural grievances that might otherwise lead to violence, even war.

This leads directly to the second fundamental point: the greatest dangers come not from lower-level instability associated with protests, riots, and work stoppages, but rather from violence at scale, especially in the form of organized civil or interstate war. Preserving peace is far more important, in human, economic, and geostrategic terms, than is maintaining stability. Indeed, a certain level of nonviolent instability can help to secure a stable peace if it compels the state to take actions that preempt the intensification and spread of deeper structural grievances—actions it would not choose without pressure. Riots are dangerous to local populations primarily insofar as they enable an opposition to build larger, more durable coalitions for violent political struggle against a regime. State and private actions can defuse more threatening and dangerous guerilla movements, terrorism, and civil or interstate war. Underappreciation of the central place of preventive and responsive action in mediating the relationship between food security and sociopolitical stability is perhaps the greatest deficiency of recent debates, which tend to treat the sociopolitical risks of food insecurity as driven largely by exogenous forcing variables such as climate or global market prices.

#### COVID-caused remittance loss and migration restrictions collapse global markets.

UN 11/10, citing David Beasley, Executive Director of the UN World Food Programme. (UN News, 11/10/20, "COVID-19 worsening food insecurity, driving displacement, warn UN agencies", https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/11/1077272)

In Populations at risk: Implications of COVID-19 for hunger, migration and displacement, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) urged the global community to step up support for the immediate and rising humanitarian needs, as well as addressing the pandemic’s fallout, especially on the most vulnerable. David Beasley, Executive Director of WFP, said that the socio-economic impact of the pandemic is more devastating than the disease itself. “Many people in low- and middle-income countries, who a few months ago were poor but just about getting by, now find their livelihoods have been destroyed,” he said. “Remittances sent from workers abroad to their families at home have also dried up, causing immense hardship. As a result, hunger rates are sky-rocketing around the world.” The report – the first of its kind – assessed the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for people’s food security in major migration and hunger hotspots around the world. It revealed important linkages between the two, with food insecurity – especially when combined with conflict, being one of the main drivers for people to move. Unprecedented impact The impact the pandemic has had on the ways people move is “unprecedented”, according to the two UN agencies. Measures and restrictions put in place to contain the spread of the disease have limited human mobility, opportunities to work and earn an income, straining the ability of migrant and displaced people to afford food and other basic needs. António Vitorino, Director-General of IOM, highlighted COVID-19’s impact on health and human movement, warning that it not only threatens global commitment but also ongoing assistance. “The impact of the COVID-19 crisis on health and human mobility threatens to roll back global commitments, including for the Global Compact on Migration, and hinder ongoing efforts to support those in need of assistance,” he said. “It is our collective responsibility to safeguard the rights of people on the move and ensure their protection from further harm,” he added. Hunger, displacement ‘closely intertwined’ According to the report, food insecurity and displacement are closely linked: nine out of ten of the world’s worst food crises are in countries with the largest number of internally displaced persons, while the majority of displaced people are located in countries affected by acute food insecurity and malnutrition. Migrant workers, especially those working in the temporary or informal sector, are some of the worst hit by the pandemic and its fallout. Without sustained income, many will not only be pushed to return home but will also cause at least a temporary drop in remittances that provide an essential lifeline for around 800 million – or one in nine – people in the world, the report added. At the same time, disruptions to seasonal agricultural work could hit the production, processing and distribution of food, affecting food availability and affordability at local and regional levels.

#### Russia/Ukraine crises is a terminal alt cause – price spikes, food instability, and ag collapse from lack of fertilizer make their impacts inevitable

Tan 2/23

Weizhen Tan (Weizhen is the Markets Editor at CNBC’s Asia Pacific headquarters in Singapore. In that role she oversees and reports on key Asian asset categories, international markets, central banks, global trade and macroeconomic trends), “How a Russian invasion of Ukraine, the ‘breadbasket of Europe,’ could hit supply chains,” *CNBC,* 2/23/22. <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/23/impact-of-russia-ukraine-on-supply-chains-food-metals-commodities.html> \*edited for ableist language

Oil and gas prices are set to spike further as the Russia-Ukraine crisis escalates, but the impact on energy won’t be the only ramification.

From wheat to barley, and copper to nickel, analysts tell CNBC that supply chains are set to be disrupted as the crisis takes a turn for the worse.

Ukraine is considered the “breadbasket of Europe,” and an invasion would result in the food supply chain getting “hit hard,” said Alan Holland, CEO and founder at sourcing technology company Keelvar.

Russia and Ukraine are also big suppliers of metals and other commodities, analysts said.

Tensions between Russia and Ukraine reached fever pitch in the past few days as President Vladimir Putin ordered the Kremlin’s forces into two pro-Russian separatist regions in eastern Ukraine. It came after he said Russia would formally recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk.

U.S. President Joe Biden on Tuesday described Russia’s actions as the beginning “an invasion” of Ukraine.

Here’s what’s at risk if a military conflict takes place or ~~crippling~~ [devastating] sanctions are imposed.

Food security

Ukraine produces wheat, barley and rye that much of Europe relies on, analysts said. It’s also a big producer of corn.

“Even though harvesting season is still a few months away, a prolonged conflict would create bread shortages [and increase consumer prices] this fall,” said Holland.

In fact, it’s not just the European Union that will be hit — many nations in the Middle East and Africa also rely on Ukranian wheat and corn, and disruptions to that supply could affect food security in those regions, said Dawn Tiura, president at Sourcing Industry Group.

“China is also a big recipient of Ukrainian corn — in fact, Ukraine replaced the U.S. as China’s top corn supplier in 2021,” she said.

[Chart omitted]

Wheat and corn prices were already soaring. Wheat futures traded in Chicago have jumped about 12% since the start of this year, while corn futures spiked 14.5% in the same period.

Food inflation has been rising, and could worsen if an armed conflict erupts.

“Rising food prices would only be exacerbated with additional price shocks, especially if core agricultural areas in Ukraine are seized by Russian loyalists,” said Per Hong, senior partner at consulting firm Kearney.

He pointed out that Russia is also the world’s top wheat exporter. Together with Ukraine, both account for roughly 29% of the global wheat export market.

Further, any disruptions to the natural gas supply will in turn affect the production of energy-intensive products such as fertilizers — and that’s bound to hit agriculture further, said Holland. Fertilizers were already in short supply last year, leading to soaring prices.

Russia was the largest supplier of natural gas and oil to the European Union last year.